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Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo 
Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive 
Forum Provision 
Brian JM Quinn* 
Observers note a trend of shareholder lawsuits migrating out of 
Delaware. This trend is a manifestation of a litigation strategy by 
plaintiffs’ counsel to avoid Delaware’s aggressive policing of agency costs 
in acquisition-related shareholder litigation and to gain control over such 
litigation by bringing these cases outside of Delaware. To the extent 
agency costs drive acquisition-related litigation, such litigation can be 
costly to shareholders without much by way of tangible benefits to them. 
In addition to being potentially wasteful for shareholders, a sustained 
outward migration of cases from Delaware to other venues may threaten 
Delaware’s ability to maintain and develop its own corporate law. For 
these reasons, various stakeholders including shareholders, the judiciary, 
and policymakers, have an incentive to consider the implications of these 
multiforum litigation strategies and formulate a response. Some 
commentators have proposed that firms adopt forum selection provisions 
in their corporate charters and bylaws as a way of reducing incentives for 
shareholder plaintiffs to engage in wasteful lawsuits or forum shopping. 
Notwithstanding the fact that incorporators are free to contract around 
default rules and adopt innovative self-help provisions, few firms have 
taken that step. This Article argues that insights from behavioral 
economics can provide some understanding of why this may be the case. In 
particular, status quo bias in contracting reduces incentives for 
incorporators to pursue more creative approaches to drafting the 
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corporate contract. However, status quo bias may be overcome through the 
use of opt-in menus, which have been useful in increasing contractual 
flexibility in other contexts in corporate law and may prove helpful in 
overcoming cognitive constraints to innovation. By increasing flexibility in 
corporate contracts, shareholders should be able to moderate the effects of 
status quo bias and develop charter terms more likely to reflect their true 
preferences. Properly structured exclusive forum provisions will reduce 
incentives to bring wasteful litigation while leaving open opportunities for 
shareholders to bring valuable lawsuits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Delaware and its corporate law are at a crossroads. Observers point 
out a migration of shareholder lawsuits from Delaware, as litigants in 
acquisition-related litigation shop for forums outside the state of 
incorporation as part of a multiforum litigation strategy.1 Through 
forum shopping, plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to avoid Delaware’s recent 
turn towards more aggressive policing of agency costs in acquisition-
related shareholder litigation, as well as to improve their relative 
position in the competition for fees.2 Forum shopping by plaintiffs’ 
counsel can be costly to shareholders because it increases the costs of 
defending and settling litigation where the benefits of such litigation 
may be all but illusory. 
There are a number of possible responses to the outward migration 
of cases from Delaware. Policymakers may permit the trend to 
continue; however, over time this exodus could result in a 
deterioration of Delaware’s ability to develop and maintain its own 
corporate law.3 If Delaware is overly aggressive in attempting to 
prevent the outward movement of cases, it may result in unanticipated 
 
 1 See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (noting how plaintiffs’ counsel attempt to avoid judicial oversight in Delaware 
by filing in other forums); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, 
and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 62 (2009) (analyzing 
potential availability of forum selection provision for intra-corporate disputes); Sara J. 
Lewis, Note, Transforming the Anywhere but Chancery Problem into the Nowhere by 
Chancery Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 199 (2008) (discussing validity of 
Delaware forum selection provision for intra-entity disputes) Anywhere But Chancery: 
Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17 
[hereinafter Mirvis] (considering the possibility of exclusion forum provisions to 
prevent migration of shareholder lawsuits from Delaware courts); see also John 
Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 Ind. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter 
Delaware’s Balancing Act]; John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 5 
(European Corporate Gov’t Inst., Working Paper No. 174, 2010) [hereinafter Is 
Delaware Losing Its Cases?], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404; Joseph 
Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: Mandatory and 
Elective Approaches: The 2010 Pileggi Lecture (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at 
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690561). 
 2 Acquisition-related litigation that seeks to enjoin announced transactions is 
common. Thompson and Thomas found that approximately 80% of shareholder 
lawsuits filed in the Delaware Chancery Court during 1999–2000 allege some 
violation of fiduciary duties of directors in connection with a merger or sale of the 
corporation. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of 
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 
(2004). 
 3 Armour et al. also recognize this possibility. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing 
Act, supra note 1, at 44. 
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negative consequences for Delaware. In attempting to prevent 
plaintiffs’ counsel from seeking alternate forums, Delaware 
policymakers may provoke severe reactions from relevant 
constituencies, including the plaintiff’s bar, federal regulators, and 
other states’ judiciaries.4 Given Delaware’s importance in the corporate 
world, corporate law is presently at a critical inflection point. 
Transaction-related litigation is a common feature in the landscape 
of deal making.5 A significant percentage of corporate transactions are 
accompanied by shareholder litigation. Over the past decade, 
shareholders have increasingly elected to bring state-law actions 
against Delaware corporations in jurisdictions outside the state of 
incorporation. Typically, shareholder plaintiffs file claims in a state 
where the firm is headquartered or a state in which the firm has 
significant operations, or both.6 The available data clearly evidence a 
strong trend of avoiding filing shareholder litigation exclusively in the 
state of incorporation and suggest that plaintiffs are actively avoiding 
Delaware courts. In the words of Professors Armour, Black, and 
Cheffins, who were the first to document this trend, “Delaware is 
losing its cases.”7 
Although plaintiffs appear keen to avoid Delaware courts, they do 
not necessarily seek to avoid Delaware law. Few plaintiffs, if any, 
challenge the position of the “internal affairs doctrine” by bringing 
claims under the corporate law of their chosen forum state.8 Relatedly, 
 
 4 Stevelman and Armour et al. recognize the nature of this balancing act and urge 
caution. See Stevelman, supra note 1, at 137; see also Armour et al., Delaware’s 
Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 2. 
 5 The large incidence of transaction-related shareholder litigation in recent 
months attracted the attention of the financial press. The number of lawsuits filed 
incident to an announced merger has, according to the Securities Class Action 
Services, increased from 27 in 2006 to 191 in 2009, and to more than 216 in 2010. See 
Dionne Searcey & Ashby Jones, First, the Merger; Then the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
10, 2011, at C1. For an overview of the incidence of transaction-related litigation, see 
Thompson & Thomas, supra note 2, at 137. 
 6 Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 1, at 3. 
 7 See id. at 15. Armour et al. coined the phrase “out-of-Delaware” with respect to 
current multiforum shareholder litigation. 
 8 The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that  
only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal 
affairs — matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders — because 
otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands. 
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). The role and application of the 
internal affairs doctrine in the corporate law is the center of a significant discourse 
related to the discourse on state competition for incorporations. See, e.g., Deborah A. 
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there is not yet a movement towards a European “real seat doctrine” 
with respect to the application of corporate law.9 Rather, this pattern 
of moving litigation away from the state of incorporation reflects an 
intentional strategy by plaintiffs’ counsel to engage in forum 
shopping.10 By filing claims based on Delaware law in foreign 
jurisdictions, litigants avoid recent attempts by the Delaware courts to 
raise pleading standards and actively police plaintiffs’ attorney fees 
while accepting the underlying validity of Delaware’s position with 
respect to the corporate law.11 
The exclusive forum provision is an effective mechanism for 
addressing the out-of-Delaware trend.12 Such a provision creates a 
presumption that shareholder derivative or state-based shareholder 
class action lawsuits be brought exclusively in the courts of the state of 
incorporation. The inclusion of an exclusive forum provision in a 
 
DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 161, 161-72 (1985) (providing an overview of various state accommodations to 
application of the internal affairs doctrine); see also Kent Greenfield, Democracy and 
the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 140 
(2004). 
 9 The “real seat doctrine” is a choice of law principle that applies the law of the 
corporation’s real seat — its corporate headquarters or significant operations — to the 
questions of the corporate law. In the United States, courts have traditionally applied 
the “internal affairs doctrine” to this same question. The internal affairs doctrine 
applies the law of the state of incorporation to questions of the corporate law without 
regard to the location of the corporation’s real operations. Since the European Court 
of Justice’s decision in Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
1999 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 11 (Mar. 9, 1999) , there is a serious question whether the 
traditional real seat doctrine governing the choice of laws for corporate law in Europe 
conforms to the European Community Treaty. For a discussion of the difficulties 
raised by the Centros decision with respect to the sustainability of the real seat 
doctrine, see Werner F. Ebke, The Real Seat Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws, 
36 INT’L. L. 1015, 1015-16 (2004). 
 10 Professor Stevelman as well as Professors Armour et al. observe that forum 
shopping likely lies at the heart of this out-of-Delaware trend. See Stevelman, supra 
note 1, at 100; see also Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 32-35 
(observing the out-of-Delaware trend beginning in 2006 following increased judicial 
scrutiny of attorney fees in transaction-related litigation).  
 11 For a recent example of a Delaware court policing attorney fee requests see In re 
Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 WL 2519210, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 29, 2011) (awarding only $75,000 of a $750,000 fee request). 
 12 See Mirvis, supra note 1, at 17; Lewis, supra note 1, at 202; Grundfest, supra 
note 1, at 14, 16. But see Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 4-5; 
Stevelman, supra note 1, at 133-35; see also In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’Holders 
Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 n.12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) 
(observing that exclusive forum provisions may not be required); In re Revlon, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-61 (Del. Ch. 2010) (recognizing the potential 
viability of a forum selection provision).  
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firm’s corporate charter reduces incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel to 
engage in the forum shopping that makes the out-of-Delaware 
litigation strategy valuable for plaintiffs. Bringing the various 
litigations under the supervision of a single court through the 
application of an exclusive forum provision improves judicial 
efficiency and reduces agency costs. 
Given the obvious advantages of adopting exclusive forum 
provisions, it is perplexing that few corporate charters contain such 
provisions. Less than five percent of firms going public during 2010 
included such a provision in their corporate charters.13 Experimental 
results from behavioral economics suggest both reasons for the 
hesitancy of firms to adopt otherwise value enhancing charter 
amendments as well as possible solutions. The dominant framework 
for understanding corporate law teaches us that parties left to freely 
contract will on balance negotiate efficient terms for their corporate 
charters.14 Default terms in corporate law play the role of replicating 
efficient terms that parties would negotiate in the absence of 
transaction costs.15 Behavioral economics suggests the framing of 
decisions, including the selection of contract defaults, is important in 
determining outcome of such decisions. Therefore, the presence or 
absence of default terms often results in status quo bias in contracting, 
inhibiting innovation even when such innovations might be socially 
valuable. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the problem of the 
out-of-Delaware trend with respect to transaction-related lawsuits. 
Part II describes four possible yet flawed responses to the out-of-
Delaware trend: the hands-off approach; Delaware self-help; 
elimination of the Delaware carve-out; and the federal judicial panel 
on multi-district litigation. Part III then argues that including an 
exclusive forum provision in corporate charters would be an effective 
response to the out-of-Delaware problem by reducing plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s incentive for forum shopping. Part IV reviews the behavioral 
economics literature to understand why it might be that firms have 
been reluctant to adopt the exclusive forum provisions. Part V 
recommends the adoption of a new opt-in provision for the Delaware 
 
 13 See Fig. 1 and accompanying text for how many firms are going public and 
Appendix B for a list of firms that went public with exclusive forum provisions. 
 14 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15-22 (1991) (describing corporation as contract framework). 
 15 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetch & Richard Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 198 (1991) (describing stickiness 
effects of default positions). 
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corporate code to overcome behavioral barriers and facilitate the 
adoption of this efficiency enhancing provision. The Article concludes 
by making recommendations for further empirical research specifically 
with respect to the economic effects of forum selection provisions in 
corporate charters on firm value. More generally, if policymakers 
pursue a menu approach to corporate contracting with regard to 
forum selection, that experience can inform the use of opt-in menus in 
other areas of corporate law where we expect and know that market 
participants are cognitively constrained. 
I. THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE TREND AND MULTIFORUM LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES 
Transaction-related shareholder lawsuits have long been subject to 
agency cost problems.16 Over the years, there have been many reform 
efforts at the federal and state levels intended to control those costs 
and reduce incentives for abuse. The results of those efforts have been 
mixed, often resulting in unintended consequences as litigants sought 
to find ways around restrictions. Recent empirical work by Professors 
Armour, Black, and Cheffins suggests that plaintiffs are actively 
seeking to file shareholder litigation in jurisdictions other than 
Delaware, the state of incorporation.17 The out-of-Delaware litigation 
strategy appears to be, first, an effort by plaintiffs’ counsel to skirt 
attempts by the Delaware judiciary to more closely monitor agency 
costs associated with shareholder lawsuits, in particular by raising 
pleading standards and policing attorneys’ fees. Second, to the extent 
out-of-Delaware litigation is beyond the reach of the Delaware 
judiciary, it places out-of-Delaware plaintiffs’ counsel in a more 
competitive position vis-à-vis other plaintiffs’ counsel to control the 
outcome of the litigation. Thus, the multiforum litigation strategy may 
also be interpreted as a natural response to the competitive pressures 
of the plaintiff’s bar. 
The experience of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad is 
helpful in understanding the out-of-Delaware trend and the 
 
 16 Professors Weiss & White observe that the Delaware law creates incentives for 
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits in change of control transactions or in transactions 
involving controlling shareholders whether or not it appears that the board appeared 
to violate their fiduciary duties to the corporation. See Eliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. 
White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1804 (2004) (providing extensive analysis of 
transaction-related settlements). 
 17 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, 1-2; see also Armour 
et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
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multiforum litigation strategy. On November 3, 2009, Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Railroad, a Delaware corporation headquartered in 
Texas, announced that it would be acquired by an affiliate of Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc.18 Four shareholder class actions were filed in Tarrant 
County, Texas, and three additional shareholder class action lawsuits 
were filed in Dallas County, Texas the same day as the 
announcement.19 Complaints were also filed in the Delaware Chancery 
Court two days later.20 The Texas and Delaware complaints made 
nearly identical allegations — that the board of Burlington Northern 
violated its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, in particular its duties 
under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, when it agreed to 
sell the corporation.21 Less than a month after the initial actions were 
filed, the defendants in the Delaware actions moved to have all the 
actions proceed in a single forum to avoid duplication.22 The 
 
 18 Berkshire Hathaway already owned a 22% block of the railroad. Verified Class 
Action Complaint at 1, In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holders Litig., No. 5043-VCL 
(Del. Ch. Ct. Nov 5, 2009). 
 19 Tarrant County actions: Petition Based Upon Self-Dealing and Break of 
Fiduciary Duty at 1, Kinsey v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp., No. 348-241465-09 
(Tex. Dist. Nov. 3, 2009); Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 1, Graulich v. Boeckmann, No. 
141-241528-09 (Tex. Dist. Nov. 6, 2009); Petition Based Upon Self-Dealing and Break 
of Fiduciary Duty at 1, Lewis v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp., No. 017-241596-
09 (Tex. Dist. Nov. 9, 2009); and Shareholder Class Action Complaint at 1, Satinoff v. 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp., No. 048-241702-09 (Tex. Dist. Nov. 13, 2009). 
The Dallas County actions were consolidated under the action Employee Retirement 
System of New Orleans v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp., No. 09-14950, (Tex. Dist. 
Nov. 4, 2009) and then later consolidated under the Tarrant County actions as In re 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. Shareholders Class Action Litigation, No. 348-
241465-09. 
 20 Complaint at 1, Kahn-Kirby v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., No. 5082-VCL, 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2009); Verified Class Action Complaint at 1, Louisiana Mun. Police 
Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., No. 5043-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 5. 2009); 
Complaint at 1, High Tech Inv. Club v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., No. 5044-VCL, 
(Del. Ch. Nov 5, 2009); Verified Class Action Complaint at 1, Ferris v. Burlington N. 
Santa Fe Corp., No. 5045-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2009); Verified Class Action 
Complaint at 1, August v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., No. 5062-VCL, (Del. Ch. Nov. 
10, 2009).  
 21 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986).  
 22 Defendants filed a motion to proceed in one forum, also known as a Savitt 
motion, in which defendants asked the Delaware court to coordinate with the Texas 
court to permit litigation in a single forum so that “Defendants are not required to 
defend substantially identical . . . class action lawsuits in different states.” Motion to 
Proceed in One Forum at 1, In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holders Litig., No. 5043-VCL 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2009). Defendants did not move to litigate the case in either state. 
Defendants moved to ask the court to intervene with competition among the various 
plaintiff groups in both states. Defendants moved to request that the Delaware court 
conduct a telephone conversation with the Texas court to resolve the impasse. See id.; 
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substance of the motion was not to seek a particular venue; rather, the 
motion asked the court to intervene in the competition amongst the 
various plaintiffs groups and resolve an impasse regarding where the 
litigation would be conducted.23 The Texas litigation was stayed in 
favor of the litigation in Delaware, with the Delaware court ordering 
the Delaware plaintiffs to coordinate with the Texas plaintiffs with 
respect to the litigation.24 While litigation was ongoing, shareholders 
approved the deal on February 11, 2010, and then completed the 
transaction on February 12, 2010.25 By August 2010, the Texas and 
Delaware plaintiffs agreed to consolidate and settle their cases.26 The 
terms of the settlement were typical of “disclosure only settlements.”27 
Burlington Northern stipulated that it had amended its disclosures to 
the shareholders in advance of the shareholder vote principally in 
response to the Delaware and Texas actions.28 In addition, the 
settlement included an agreement to pay a fee to plaintiffs’ counsel in 
Delaware and Texas for their efforts in bringing the suit.29 In effect, 
the settlement included no substantive changes to the structure of the 
transaction or the consideration received by selling shareholders, but 
 
see also letter from Joseph A. Rosenthal, Shareholder, Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, 
P.A., to the Honorable J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery 
(Dec. 8, 2009) (on file with the author)(challenging defendants’ jurisdictional 
motion); letter from Raymond DiCamillo, Director, Richards, Layton & Finger, to The 
Honorable J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery (Dec. 1, 
2009) (on file with the author)  (supporting defendants’ jurisdictional motion). 
 23 Motion to Proceed in One Forum, supra note 22, at 6. The defendants moved to 
request that the Delaware court conduct a telephone conversation with the Texas 
court to resolve the impasse. 
 24 In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holders Litig., CA No. 5043-VCL, (Del. Ch. Dec. 
9, 2009); see sources cited supra note 22. 
 25 See Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC, Schedule 13 D/A (Feb. 16, 2010). 
 26 Stipulation of Settlement at 15, In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holders Litig., No. 
5043-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2010); Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC, Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 20, 2010). 
 27 Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 26, at 8. “Disclosure only” settlements are 
common in transaction-related litigation. For a discussion of the court’s approach to 
disclosure only settlements and attorney fees for such settlements, see In re Sauer-
Danfoss S’holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 WL 2519210, at *17-18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
29, 2011).  
 28 Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 26. This type of “disclosure only” 
settlement is common in transaction-related litigation. For a discussion of the court’s 
approach to attorney fees and the disclosure only settlement see In re Sauer-Danfoss, 
2011 WL 2519210, at *17-18.  
 29 On October 28, 2010, the Delaware Vice Chancellor awarded $450,000, which 
he suggested would be sufficient to cover the costs of litigation in both Delaware and 
Texas. The Texas plaintiffs subsequently sought $1.2 million in fees in Texas. 
Burlington N. Santa Fe, Inc., Quarterly Report 35 (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 5, 2010). 
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it did include an agreement for the defendant to pay the fees of 
plaintiffs’ counsel. While shareholders received no benefit from the 
lawsuit, they bore the costs in the form of attorneys’ fees. 
The litigation experience of Burlington Northern is typical of firms 
on the receiving end of transaction-related litigation. This experience 
suggests a role for the exclusive forum provision mitigating the out-of-
Delaware problem. The trend of plaintiffs bringing shareholder 
lawsuits against Delaware corporations “anywhere but Chancery” has 
been noted by a number of observers in recent years.30 These lawsuits 
are typically state-law fiduciary duty claims based in Delaware law 
brought in the state of the corporation’s headquarters.31 Shareholders 
of Delaware corporations file these lawsuits elsewhere in response to 
Delaware’s efforts to more aggressively monitor agency costs with 
respect to shareholder lawsuits, as well as in response to the 
competitive pressures of the plaintiff’s bar.32 This strategy may be best 
understood as an attempt by litigants to arbitrage the differences in the 
policing of agency costs in settlements between Delaware courts and 
courts in foreign jurisdictions. By controlling foreign litigation, 
plaintiffs’ counsel place themselves in a position to assert leadership 
positions in settlement discussions and thus secure access to attorneys’ 
fees when the foreign litigation is ultimately consolidated with 
litigation in the state of incorporation.33 
 
 30 See Mervis, supra note 1, at 17; Stevelman, supra note 1, at 60; Grundfest, supra 
note 1, at 8, 18; Lewis, supra note 1, at 199.  
 31 All the cases filed in connection with the Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
transaction were state law fiduciary duty claims based in Delaware law. See cases cited 
supra note 19; cases cited supra note 20. 
 32 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 1-2; Stevelman, 
supra note 1, at 96-101; see also Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra 
note 1, at 5. However, Weiss and White’s earlier paper disputes the notion that the 
Chancery Court effectively monitors agency costs with respect to settlements. See 
Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1845. Jensen and Meckling define agency costs as: 
(1) monitoring expenditures by the principal; (2) bonding expenditures by the agent; 
and (3) any residual loss from any situation when an agent acts on behalf of a will not 
always act in the best interests of the principal. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 33 Defendants will often refuse to settle litigation in the state of incorporation 
unless the plaintiffs’ committee secures dismissal in foreign jurisdictions as part of a 
global settlement. A plaintiff in control of litigation in a foreign jurisdiction therefore 
may be able to secure fees in exchange for accepting a global litigation settlement in 
the state of incorporation. The same is true for Delaware counsel if defendants settle 
litigation in foreign jurisdictions first.  
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Professors Armour, Black, and Cheffins were the first to empirically 
document the dramatic shift of litigation outside Delaware.34 A search 
of the SDC Platinum databases for merger transactions between 
August 2009 and August 2010 generated 119 transactions involving 
public company Delaware targets not in bankruptcy with transaction 
values larger than $100 million.35 A subsequent review of SEC filings 
for this sample reveals ninety-seven transactions, or approximately 
eighty-two percent of the sample, in which there was some 
acquisition-related litigation that accompanied the deal. Of the 
transactions that disclosed litigation, eighty-five percent disclosed 
more than one lawsuit, suggesting a pattern of competition amongst 
plaintiffs’ counsel for the lead plaintiff position and control over the 
litigation.36 Where there were multiple suits filed, the average number 
of lawsuits was 5.3 per transaction, with a median of four lawsuits per 
transaction. In the extreme case, the Blackstone Group’s acquisition of 
Texas-based Dynegy Inc. generated twenty-six lawsuits related to one 
transaction — twenty claims in Texas and six in Delaware.37 
Of the transactions that disclosed transaction-related litigation, fifty-
three percent disclosed litigation in multiple states. In cases where 
multiple complaints are filed in various jurisdictions, nearly thirty 
percent of cases are first filed in a foreign jurisdiction. The typical 
non-Delaware location to bring a foreign suit in this sample was the 
state court where the target had its headquarters. Consistent with 
findings from Armour, Black, and Cheffins, a substantial proportion of 
transaction-related litigation against Delaware corporations is never 
brought to the Delaware courts at all.38 Forty percent of transaction-
related litigation is brought only outside of Delaware, and only seven 
percent of that litigation is brought in Delaware alone.39 
 
 34 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 6; see also Armour 
et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 1, at 5-6.  
 35 Database search for merger transactions, Thompson Financial SDC Platinum 
(Oct. 8, 2010) (excluding buybacks, exchange offers, and partial acquisitions).  
 36 The phenomena of multiple lawsuits accompanying a corporate transaction is 
not new and has been previously documented elsewhere. See, e.g., FRANKLIN SECOR 
WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944) 
(documenting multiplicative derivative lawsuits in New York courts); Weiss & White, 
supra note 16 (analyzing litigation patterns). 
 37 Information on the lawsuit brought in response of this transaction are readily 
available through the SDC Platinum Database as well as the SEC’s website. See 
database search for merger transactions, supra note 35. 
 38 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 10-12; Armour et 
al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 1, at 22 (suggesting these percentages 
have been increasing in recent years). 
 39 See database search for merger transactions, supra note 35. 
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Table 1: Public Company Mergers 2009-201040 
 
 Number Percentage of total 
Total transactions 119 100% 
No litigation 22 18% 
Some litigation 97 82% 
 
Table 2: Public Company Mergers with Some Litigation 2009-201041 
 
 Number 
Percentage of 
those with 
litigation 
Multiple litigation 82 85% 
Litigation in multiple jurisdictions  50 53% 
Litigation in Delaware only 8 7% 
Litigation outside of Delaware only 41 40% 
First filed outside Delaware 29 30% 
 
If the out-of-Delaware trend were a verdict on the substance of 
Delaware law, then the trend might represent an important short-term 
shift away from what has become a steady equilibrium in state 
competition for corporate law. However, rarely do plaintiffs in foreign 
litigation bring claims that attempt to assert the corporate law of the 
forum over Delaware law.42 Plaintiffs are willing to accept Delaware 
law, just not Delaware courts. There is not a nascent shareholder 
plaintiff movement to assert “real seat” doctrine over the traditional 
internal affairs doctrine. Plaintiffs appear to still accept the internal 
affairs doctrine as a traditional choice of law provision that governs 
the relationships between shareholders and the corporation. 
Therefore, the current litigation trend is not a verdict on the substance 
of Delaware’s corporate law. 
 
 40 See database search for merger transactions, supra note 35. 
 41 Id. 
 42 For example, in the New York Supreme Court case In the Matter of The Topps 
Company Shareholders Litigation, the issue in dispute was not whether Delaware law 
was the appropriate law by which to judge the plaintiff’s claims but whether New York 
was an appropriate forum given a competing case making similar claims 
simultaneously before the Delaware courts. See In re The Topps Co. Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007).  
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Indeed, disputes over the proper venue in the context of shareholder 
litigation differ from venue disputes in, for example, a typical contract 
case. In a contract case, a plaintiff and defendant may fight over the 
proper venue to hear a case. The forum non conveniens doctrine 
developed around the traditional strategic litigation model in which a 
plaintiff sues in a mutually convenient forum and then the defendant 
files a competing claim in a forum that is advantageous to the 
defendant alone. The doctrine is highly deferential to the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum, thus preventing defendants from strategically 
shopping for a forum that would plainly disadvantage the plaintiff.43 
However, the doctrine is not wholly applicable in the context of 
modern shareholder litigation. In modern shareholder litigation, there 
are typically competing plaintiff groups who fight over the control of 
litigation and selection venue. Courts must sift through arguments 
from the competing groups seeking control of the litigation. 
Defendants are often agnostic as to the venue, but seek certainty and 
economy with respect to litigation.44 In that context, forum non 
conveniens arguments are not altogether applicable. The questions are 
not necessarily related to defendants’ litigation strategies, as they are 
asserting some degree of control over competing plaintiffs. Control 
over litigation and access to fees are an important motivating factor in 
this competition amongst plaintiff groups.45 Such was the case in the 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe litigation where the defendants and the 
courts of Texas and Delaware were placed in the position of having to 
mediate among the competing groups of plaintiffs’ counsel in two 
states vying for control over the litigation.46 This was also the case in 
litigation related to the acquisition of The Topps Company, Inc. in 
2007, where competing groups of plaintiffs in New York and Delaware 
 
 43 See McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 A.2d 
281, 283 (Del. 1970) (observing that a defendant should not be permitted to defeat a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum simply by commencing litigation involving the same cause 
of action in another jurisdiction). 
 44 Defendant’s Savitt motion asked only that the court work with judges in the 
multiple Texas courts to determine an appropriate venue. Defendants did not express 
a preference to hear the case in Texas or Delaware. See letter from Raymond 
DiCamillo to The Honorable J. Travis Laster, supra note 22 (supporting defendants’ 
jurisdictional motion). 
 45 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory For Private Enforcement Of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 680 (1986) [hereinafter Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney] 
(describing the central role of fees in motivating shareholder litigation); see also Weiss 
& White, supra note 16, at 1829-30.  
 46 See sources cited supra notes 18-20. 
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battled over control of litigation.47 In both cases, the defendants were 
essentially agnostic with respect to the location of the litigation while 
plaintiff groups fought each other over control. Rather than the fight 
over venue being between plaintiff and defendant as is normal in 
forum non conveniens cases, in the shareholder litigation context, the 
fight over venue is often one where the defendant is agnostic with 
respect to the forum, and the fight is amongst competing groups of 
plaintiffs’ counsels who seek to control the litigation. 
The shareholder lawsuits that are of concern in this Article are of a 
particular type: acquisition-related lawsuits. These suits are fall into 
two general categories: first, suits brought in conjunction with change 
of control transactions where the board is alleged to have failed to 
fulfill its fiduciary obligations under Revlon; and second, suits brought 
in conjunction with cash-out transactions with controlling 
shareholders where directors are alleged to have violated their 
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders.48 Professors Weiss and 
White observe that Delaware law creates incentives for plaintiffs to 
bring lawsuits in change of control transactions or in transactions 
involving controlling shareholders, whether or not the board violated 
its fiduciary duties to the corporation.49 In such litigation, the ultimate 
settlements may often include minor changes in disclosures, lowering 
the value of termination fees, or nominal increases in consideration.50 
In all situations, settlements include payment of plaintiff attorneys’ 
fees.51 Weiss and White examined settlements of transaction-related 
lawsuits and found that, in cases where plaintiffs’ counsel claimed to 
have negotiated cash settlements for shareholders: 
“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys frequently were able to free ride on the 
improved terms negotiated by SNCs [special litigation 
committees] or on the price improvements that resulted from 
competing bids, that they rarely claimed a major share of the 
credit for the improvements, and that they never persisted in 
 
 47 See In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007); In 
re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 2007 WL 5018882, at *1-2. 
 48 Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1804.  
 49 Id. 
 50 See id. at 1818, 1837; see also In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 
947 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing transactional tweaks as part of the “settlement 
technology”).  
 51 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: An Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991) (describing plaintiffs’ counsel in shareholder lawsuits 
as entrepreneurial). 
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challenging the terms negotiated by an SNC or the terms 
proposed by a competing bidder.”52 
Put in blunt terms, most transaction-related litigation is more about 
getting access to fee distributions than it is about improving 
shareholder value or protecting the rights of shareholders. The typical 
shareholder plaintiff in transaction-related litigation is a small-stakes 
shareholder with little or no economic incentive to monitor the 
activities of counsel.53 Consequently, attorneys rather than 
shareholder plaintiffs are the real parties in interest in many 
transaction-related lawsuits.54 This type of litigation is highly 
susceptible to agency costs because the interests of counsel will not 
always align with the interests of their purported clients, the 
shareholders.55 
Multiforum litigation strategies are a response to recent attempts to 
police agency costs in transaction-related litigation and competitive 
pressures amongst plaintiffs’ counsel. On the one hand, recent efforts 
by the Delaware courts to more aggressively police settlements means 
that courts will more closely scrutinize settlements, including fees. 
Courts are willing to limit what they consider to be excessive fees.56 
On the other hand, bringing claims in courts outside the state of 
incorporation has two benefits from the point of view of plaintiff 
counsel: First, courts in foreign jurisdictions are less likely to closely 
scrutinize resulting settlements;57 and second, even if multiple cases 
are consolidated in the state of incorporation, by controlling the 
 
 52 See Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1829. 
 53 Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 5. 
 54 The role of plaintiff counsel as the true party in interest in shareholder lawsuits 
is well understood. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
549-50 (1949) (observing the problem of incentives present in shareholder litigation: 
“[W]hile the stockholders have chosen the corporate director or manager, they have 
no such election as to a plaintiff who steps forward to represent them.”); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 888 (1987) (recognizing the 
central importance of the plaintiff attorney as a “bounty hunter” in bringing 
litigation); Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 45, at 678 
(observing that it is well understood that the shareholder plaintiff has only a nominal 
stake in the outcome); see also Reiner Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Lawsuits 
in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1736-37 (1993) (observing that the real 
parties in interest are more likely to be attorneys with nominal shareholders in tow). 
 55 See Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra, note 45, at 679-80. 
 56 See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 WL 2519210, 
at *20 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011); In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 
604, 642 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 57 Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 4, at 28-29, 31. 
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foreign litigation, attorneys assure themselves a seat at the settlement 
table and a portion of the fee.58 Together, these two benefits form a 
powerful incentive for plaintiffs to actively seek alternate forums in 
which to litigate. 
To the extent plaintiffs are engaging in forum shopping by actively 
avoiding the Delaware forum, Stevelman and Armour, Black, and 
Cheffins have correctly identified a worrying trend from the 
perspective of shareholders, Delaware policymakers, and society, 
though each for different reasons.59 From the point of view of 
shareholders and society, the multiforum litigation strategy raises 
settlement costs of marginally valuable lawsuits and thus represents a 
deadweight loss to society.60 Shareholders, as well as courts, have an 
interest in reducing the costs of unnecessary litigation. A plaintiff’s 
litigation strategy based on bringing state claims outside the state of 
incorporation may be unnecessarily costly to shareholders who 
ultimately must directly or indirectly pay the costs of settlement. To 
the extent that courts in multiple jurisdictions are required to hear 
and adjudicate the same claims, the cost of an excessive amount of 
litigation can represent a waste of judicial resources, both in the state 
of incorporation as well as in the foreign court.61 From the perspective 
of Delaware policymakers, a plaintiff’s multiforum litigation strategy 
poses a long-term threat to Delaware’s ability to determine its own 
corporate law.62 
Although shareholder lawsuits can serve as an important 
governance device, they remain vulnerable to agency cost problems.63 
 
 58 In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at 
*5-6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (discussing the issue of fee splitting with out of state 
litigation in both the Burlington Northern Santa Fe as well as Allion Healthcare 
litigations). See generally Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1829-30 (noting that 
attorney fees were generally available in settlements). 
 59 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act , supra note 1, at 2; Stevelman, supra 
note 1, at 61-62. 
 60 Kraakman et al. posit that if a suit yields a positive recovery net of all costs that 
the corporation must bear as a consequence of suit, the suit is a net benefit to the 
corporation. Kraakman et al., supra note 54, at 1736. However, in typical transaction-
related litigation where the settlement includes modest additional disclosures, or 
nominal changes to merger terms as well as legal fees, such settlements are not likely 
to generate a net benefit for the corporation. Id. 
 61 Judicial economy and waste is a primary motivating factor for the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. See McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g 
Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970).  
 62 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 4. 
 63 The dynamics of the relationship between the plaintiff attorney and shareholder 
in the shareholder lawsuit are not dissimilar from the dynamics in the relationship 
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The small-claims nature of shareholder litigation results in collective 
action problems because individual shareholders refuse to bear the 
costs of litigation on their own.64 The plaintiff’s attorney helps resolve 
this coordination problem by becoming the real party-in-interest in 
the litigation.65 While this resolves coordination problems, 
shareholders subsequently have little incentive to monitor the actions 
of the attorney acting as their agent.66 Many reform efforts at the 
federal and state levels have attempted to control agency costs 
associated with shareholder litigation;67 however, the outcomes of 
 
between plaintiff attorneys and plaintiffs in other small stakes class action litigation. 
The agency cost problems associated with the shareholder lawsuit and potential 
reforms to mitigate agency problems have been the subject of a rich discussion over 
many years. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements 
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 536 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 76 (1985); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 
45, at 726; James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical 
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1594 
(2006); Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 
(1999); Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 3; Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: 
Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991); Thompson & 
Thomas, supra note 2, at 138; Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do 
the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs on Securities Class 
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2056-57 (1995); Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1799. 
 64 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Security for expenses bonds of the 1940s and 1950s led to a movement of 
shareholder cases from the state courts to the federal courts as litigants sought to 
avoid the higher costs of filing state based claims. See Henry W. Ballantine, Abuses of 
Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far is Califorina’s New “Security for Expenses” Act 
Sound Regulations?, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399 (1949); see also George D. Hornstein, 
The Death Knell for Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 
143-44 (1944). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) 
created incentives for litigants to move federal securities class action claims to state 
courts to avoid the strictures of the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision. See Michael A. 
Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 274 (1998) (noting the shift of cases to state courts 
following PSLRA enactment). Following enactment of the PSLRA, there is evidence 
that plaintiff counsels responded to the Act’s efforts to eliminate professional plaintiffs 
by closely associating themselves with institutional investors, leading to “pay-to-play” 
issues. See David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in 
Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2033 (2010); see also Stephen J. Choi, 
Drew T. Johnson-Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class 
Actions (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 2, 
2009), available at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/empirical/ art2. 
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those efforts have been mixed, often resulting in unintended 
consequences as litigants seek to find ways around restrictions.68 
Delaware courts have become more aggressive in policing perceived 
agency costs associated with the shareholder lawsuit and have taken a 
number of steps to control them. First, Delaware courts have declined 
to mechanically apply a “first-filed” rule when making a determination 
as to the lead plaintiff.69 Second, when Delaware courts make 
determinations about the identity of the lead plaintiff and its counsel, 
the courts have placed an increased emphasis on quality of the filings. 
In doing so, the courts encourage parties to consider the quality of the 
complaint before proceeding to file, thereby slowing the rush by 
plaintiffs to file first. In addition, the Delaware courts consider the 
relative economic stakes of competing plaintiffs, the absence of 
conflicts between institutional and smaller stockholders, competence 
of counsel, and the willingness of counsel to litigate the claim 
vigorously.70 Finally, the Delaware courts have become increasingly 
aggressive in the policing of plaintiffs’ fees, particularly with respect to 
cookie-cutter challenges to controlling shareholder transaction cases 
where the legal standards tend to guarantee plaintiffs with a settlement 
irrespective of the underlying facts.71 Professors Armour, Black, 
 
 68 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 69 See In re Chambers Dev. Co. S’holders Litig., No. 12508 , 1993 WL 179335, at 
*255 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1993) (deciding whether to issue a stay in favor of a first-filed 
action in a case where 21 claims were brought in a six-week time period); see also 
TCW Tech. Ltd. v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 18336, 18289, 18293 , 2000 WL 
1654504 , at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (“Although it might be thought, based on 
myth, fables, or mere urban legends, that the first to file a lawsuit in this Court wins 
some advantage in the race to represent the shareholder class, that assumption . . . has 
neither empirical nor logical support.”). 
 70 See Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1162 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The importance 
of quality lawyering at the pleading stage of derivative cases is obvious, given the 
higher pleading burdens applicable to derivative complaints. For this reason, Delaware 
law places more emphasis on quality than speed when assessing derivative 
complaints.”); TCW Tech, 2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (“Too often judges of this Court 
face complaints filed hastily, minutes or hours after a transaction is announced, based 
on snippets from the print or electronic media. . . It is not the race to the courthouse 
door, however, that impresses the members of this Court when it comes to deciding 
who should control and coordinate litigation on behalf of the shareholder class. In 
fact, this Court and the Delaware Supreme Court have repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of plaintiffs’ counsel taking the time to use the ‘tools at hand’. . . to 
develop a record sufficient to craft pleadings with particularized factual allegations 
necessary to survive the inevitable motions to dismiss.”). 
 71 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(reducing request for fees and describing considerations that courts take into account 
when determining reasonable fee for counsel); see also In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. 
S’holders Litig.,, 879 A.2d 604, 606 (adopting general rule not to award attorneys risk 
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Cheffins note that following internal studies of plaintiff fee awards 
during the late 1990s, Delaware reassessed its attitude toward fee 
awards.72 Observing that high levels of fee awards made Delaware an 
attractive location for plaintiffs’ counsel to bring weak claims, the 
courts adopted a new, more “parsimonious” attitude towards fees.73 
This attitude has taken the form of more aggressive review of fees in 
transaction-related cases and, when appropriate, reduction of fees 
requested by plaintiffs.74 
The out-of-Delaware litigation strategy appears to be an effort by 
plaintiffs’ counsel to skirt attempts by the Delaware judiciary to more 
closely monitor agency costs associated with shareholder lawsuits.  
Many states still follow the first-filed doctrine, thus ensuring that an 
early filer in a foreign jurisdiction gets control of the litigation.75 In 
addition, foreign courts are less likely to require that plaintiffs plead 
with particularity or fully develop the record before filing the 
shareholder suit. The combination of a strict application of the first-
filed doctrine and lower pleading standards can result in an incentive 
for plaintiff counsel to quickly file cookie-cutter complaints in foreign 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, not every foreign court will follow 
Delaware’s lead with respect to fees or process by which it selects a 
lead plaintiff. Finally, the prospect that a state court judge unfamiliar 
with the application of Delaware’s corporate code may fail to dismiss 
weak claims at an early stage of the litigation creates potential 
settlement value for plaintiff counsel. A multiforum litigation strategy 
relies on the disparate application of law and differing attitudes 
towards procedural questions to generate settlement value for plaintiff 
counsel bringing the suit. 
Delaware corporations are more vulnerable to a multiforum 
litigation strategy than corporations incorporated in other states. More 
than fifty-sixty percent of Fortune 500 firms are incorporated in 
 
premium for Lynch cases). 
 72 Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
 73 Id. at 31.  
 74 See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d at 639 (reducing fee 
award); see also In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 WL 
2519210, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011) (detailing fee levels to provide sister 
jurisdictions helpful guidance related to appropriate fee levels). 
 75 In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882, at *3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (favoring plaintiff in New York courts because they were 
first-to-file). Other states, such as Mississippi, also recognize a rule that “first to file an 
action has a right to prosecute it to its conclusion.” See Long v. McKinney, 897 So. 2d 
160, 166 (Miss. 2004); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the 
Selection of Class Action Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 656 (2002). 
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Delaware and the vast majority maintain their headquarters in a state 
other than Delaware.76 As a result, publicly traded Delaware firms 
generally have sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction before at 
least two courts, allowing plaintiffs to bring suits out of Delaware.77 
Publicly traded firms that are not incorporated in Delaware tend to be 
incorporated in the same state in which they maintain their 
headquarters.78 These firms are less likely to have personal jurisdiction 
in other courts and are therefore less vulnerable to shareholder suits in 
foreign jurisdictions. Given the particular vulnerability of Delaware 
firms to multiforum litigation strategies, a policy response may be 
appropriate. 
II. POSSIBLE BUT PROBLEMATIC RESPONSES TO THE OUT-OF-DELAWARE 
TREND 
If plaintiffs are engaged in multiforum litigation strategies that are 
not socially beneficial, the next proper question is what response is 
merited. Any solution must balance encouraging shareholders to 
pursue real claims with discouraging low-value or frivolous legal 
claims to the extent such actions do not result in real benefits for 
stockholders. To date, policymakers have not been able to find the 
balance. The history of representative litigation regulation and reform 
can be characterized as a “cat-and-mouse” game, with regulations 
being followed by unexpected consequences as plaintiffs’ counsel 
seeks alternate avenues to assert claims. It may well be that any effort 
to curtail the plaintiff’s access to foreign jurisdictions and stem the 
out-of-Delaware trend may simply result in unanticipated problems in 
the future. 
A. Hands-Off Approach 
Given the challenge presented by the out-of-Delaware trend, the 
first option for Delaware policymakers is to do nothing. If foreign 
 
 76 DIV. OF CORPS., DEL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010), available at 
http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf.  
 77 See generally Burger King v. Rudcewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (holding that 
contacts and connection with forum state should be such that defendant should 
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court there”); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (finding that unilateral acts by plaintiff not 
sufficient to satisfy requirement of contact with forum state); Int’l Shoe v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (finding that a defendant need only have 
minimum contacts with the forum state).  
 78 Robert M. Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1559, 1598 (2002). 
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courts are willing to entertain plaintiffs bringing relatively weak claims 
against Delaware corporations in their jurisdictions, Delaware should 
not be concerned. At some point, after foreign courts develop a 
reputation for being relatively lax with attorneys’ fees, they will 
become overwhelmed with litigation. In response, those courts will 
follow what the Delaware judiciary has done and begin to more 
aggressively police agency costs. Shareholder plaintiffs with legitimate 
corporate law questions and no interest in forum shopping will still 
find their way to Delaware courts to have important questions of 
corporate law decided. This hands-off approach suggests a belief that 
the market will sort itself out over the long run and that Delaware 
policymakers should not be concerned with short-term fluctuations 
associated with the out-of-Delaware trend. 
However, the hands-off approach seriously undervalues the 
importance of shareholder litigation, including litigation brought on 
behalf of professional plaintiffs, in developing and maintaining the 
Delaware corporate common law. Indeed, cases brought on behalf of 
professional plaintiffs — those that observers might argue are most 
susceptible to agency costs — are some of the most important in 
Delaware common law. Aronson v. Lewis,79 Weinberger v. UOP,80 and 
Kahn v. Lynch Communications,81 three of the most cited opinions in 
Delaware corporate law, are examples of cases brought by an 
entrepreneurial plaintiff’s bar on behalf of professional plaintiffs.82 If 
Delaware adopts an attitude that discounts the importance of claims, it 
 
 79 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 80 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 81 Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys. Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). William L. 
Weinberger, Harry Lewis, and Alan R. Kahn are among the most prolific professional 
plaintiffs with respect to Delaware corporate law. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Kahn have filed 
hundreds of lawsuits and are responsible for more than 150 written judicial opinions, 
including a U.S. Supreme Court opinion and at least dozen Delaware Supreme Court 
opinions. A review of the memoranda and trial opinions on the Delaware Supreme and 
Chancery Court websites from January 2009 through September 2010 reveals that 
14% of all the memoranda or trial opinions in the Delaware Chancery Court and the 
Delaware Supreme Court include citations to either Lewis or Kahn opinions. Kahn 
continues to be an active litigant bringing shareholder lawsuits regularly in Delaware 
and other jurisdictions. In a recent Delaware opinion, Messrs. Lewis, Weinberger, and 
Kahn were deemed “quasi-mythical” for their status as serial plaintiffs in shareholder 
lawsuits. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 944 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
Although Messrs. Weinberger and Lewis are no longer active litigants, Mr. Kahn and 
his family remain active shareholder litigants. See, e.g., Linda Parnes Kahn v. Kolberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011) ( holding that a Brophy claim does not 
require an element of harm). 
 82 See Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 7 (describing plaintiffs’ counsel in 
shareholder lawsuits as entrepreneurial). 
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risks hindering the flow of cases required to continually develop and 
maintain its corporate law.83 Doing nothing in the face of the out-of-
Delaware trend, therefore, is not a viable option for Delaware 
policymakers.84 
B. Delaware Self-Help 
Some observers, including members of the Delaware judiciary, do 
not necessarily view the out-of-Delaware trend as particularly 
alarming.85 They propose a self-help approach to ameliorating some of 
the potential ill effects of the multiforum litigation strategies.86 Central 
to the self-help approach are so-called “Savitt motions.”87 In a Savitt 
motion, parties, often defendants, file motions in multiple 
jurisdictions asking judges to confer with each other and permit the 
litigation to proceed in a single jurisdiction, while staying or 
dismissing litigation in the alternate jurisdictions.88 However, even 
supporters recognize that this ad hoc approach to self-help is not a 
foolproof solution.89 The approach relies on judges in various 
 
 83 Armour et al. argue that Delaware is already losing important cases because of 
the out-of-Delaware trend, thus impairing Delaware’s ability to determine its own 
corporate law. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 72-73. 
 84 Given its recent more aggressive attitude towards the policing of agency costs in 
shareholder lawsuits, it is unlikely that the Delaware judiciary would consider 
reversing course. Backing off oversight of the plaintiff’s bar and its aggressive policing 
stance may have the effect of reducing incentives to bring cases in foreign 
jurisdictions, but there is no indication the Delaware courts would accept such a 
radical departure from current practice. For an example of the Chancery Court 
policing fees, see In re Sauer-Danfoss S’holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 WL 251910, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011).  
 85 See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (expressing a personal preference for a voluntary approach 
to resolving this issue). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Nierenberg v. CKx, Inc., No. 5545-CC, 2011 WL 2185614, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 
27, 2011). 
 88 See id. 
 89 Chancellor Chandler stated his preferred response to this problem while 
recognizing its limitations in Allion:  
My personal preferred approach, for what it’s worth, is for defense counsel 
to file motions in both (or however many) jurisdictions where plaintiffs have 
filed suit, explicitly asking the judges in each jurisdiction to confer with one 
another and agree upon where the case should go forward. In other words—
and I mentioned this during an earlier oral argument in this case—my 
preference would be for defendants to ‘go into all the Courts in which the 
matters are pending and file a common motion that would be in front of all 
of the judges that are implicated, asking those judges to please confer and 
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jurisdictions coordinating litigation in the interests of comity and 
judicial efficiency. There is no guarantee that judges will agree to 
coordinate cases, especially high profile cases.90 
Another approach to Delaware self-help is the voluntary certification 
of corporate law questions by foreign courts to the Delaware Supreme 
Court.91 From the point of view of Delaware policymakers, losing the 
ability to update Delaware’s corporate law is a significant threat posed 
by multiforum litigation. If, however, foreign courts certify questions 
of corporate law to the Delaware Supreme Court, that threat is 
significantly reduced. Given that parties in Delaware trial courts have 
the right to appeal directly to the Delaware Supreme Court, courts are 
generally hesitant to certify questions before final adjudication of the 
issues, preferring to decide questions on complete records.92 However, 
foreign courts lack the same access to the Delaware Supreme Court 
and are less likely to have expertise in the corporate law than their 
Delaware counterparts.93 Consequently, Justice Ridgely suggested that, 
under those circumstances, foreign trial courts should be permitted to 
certify novel questions of the corporate law to the Delaware Supreme 
Court in order to reduce uncertainty with respect to corporate law 
questions that arise in foreign courts.94 Using a certification procedure, 
a foreign court confronted with an issue of first impression could 
certify the issue to the Delaware Supreme Court and receive a 
 
agree upon, in the interest of comity and judicial efficiency, if nothing else, 
what jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and which jurisdictions 
are going to stand down and allow one jurisdiction to handle the matter. . . . 
Of course . . . judges in different jurisdictions might not always find 
common ground on how to move the litigation forward. Nevertheless, this 
would be, I think, one (if not the most) efficient and pragmatic method to 
deal with this increasing problem. It is a method that has worked for me in 
every instance when it was tried.  
In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., 2011 WL 1135016, at *4 n.12. 
 90 For example, in Topps Shareholders Litigation, cases were filed in both New 
York and Delaware. The New York judge refused to defer prosecution of the New 
York cases in favor of the Delaware cases. The Delaware Vice Chancellor similarly 
refused to defer prosecution. See In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 
953 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 
5018882, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007).  
 91 Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of Guesswork: The Delaware Supreme 
Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 1127, 1132-33 (2010); 
see also Francis Pileggi, The Delaware Supreme Court and Certified Questions, DEL. CORP. 
& COM. LITIG. BLOG (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2011/02/ 
articles/commentary/the-delaware-supreme-court-and-certified-questions/. 
 92 See Ridgely, supra note 91, at 1133. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. at 1133, 1140. 
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definitive ruling on the law. In that way, Delaware would maintain 
some degree of control over the development of its own law while still 
providing plaintiffs with maximum flexibility in deciding where to file 
claims.95 Although this approach is worth pursuing, absent changes to 
facilitate foreign trial courts certifying questions directly to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, this approach will likely remain unworkable 
for the foreseeable future. 
C. Elimination of the Delaware Carve-Out 
If self-help approaches are inadequate and coordinated action is 
necessary to address the question of agency costs in multiforum 
shareholder litigation, Delaware might encourage federal lawmakers to 
revisit the “Delaware carve-out” and simply federalize all shareholder 
lawsuits.96 The Private Litigation Securities Reform Act of 1995 
(“PLSRA”) and the subsequent Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) were intended to reduce abusive shareholder 
litigation.97 SLUSA, in particular barred most securities class actions 
from being brought in state courts.98 SLUSA includes, however, a 
carve-out that “preserve[s] state-law actions brought by shareholders 
against their own corporations in connection with extraordinary 
corporate transactions requiring shareholder approval, such as 
mergers and tender offers, regardless whether the corporations issued 
nationally traded securities.”99 Congress could intervene and prevent 
plaintiff forum shopping by eliminating the right to bring state-law 
actions in the foreign courts. 
 
 95 For example, the legality of the “just say no” defense against takeovers was, 
until recently, questionable under Delaware law. The issue had never been fully 
litigated to an opinion before a Delaware trial court. The only opinion on the question 
was a federal case, Moore Corporation, Inc. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. 
Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995). Because the opinion in Moore did not come from a 
Delaware state court, the district court’s opinion that purported to uphold under 
Delaware law the “just say no” defense was not precedential. Consequently, until Air 
Products & Chemicals Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 122 (Del. Ch. 2011), was decided 
in 2010, there was considerable uncertainty about the question. Had the parties in 
Moore possessed the ability to certify a question to the Delaware Supreme Court, the 
question would have been resolved with more certainty. See Moore, 907 F.Supp. at 
1583; Airgas, 16 A.3d at 122.  
 96 Professor Fisch suggests federalizing all state law derivative claims as an option 
for improving the efficiency of selecting lead counsel. Fisch, supra note 75, at 723-24. 
 97 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§ 101-
108, 109 Stat. 737, 737-758. 
 98 SLUSA added section 16(d) of the Securities Act and section 28(f) of the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(4) (1998). 
 99 Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 971 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Federal courts are well equipped to handle thorny questions of the 
proper forum for representative litigation. The U.S. Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL Panel”) has proven capable of sorting 
out questions of forum shopping that often accompany mass tort and 
other representative litigation.100 The MDL Panel serves to centralize 
representative litigation and thus avoid duplication of discovery, 
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and finally to conserve the 
resources of the parties and the courts.101 The MDL Panel may be 
ideally suited to help resolve the problem of competing forums in the 
context of representative shareholder litigation. By eliminating the 
Delaware carve-out and essentially federalizing shareholder litigation 
in its entirety, Congress could staunch the out-of-Delaware trend. 
There are good arguments in favor of a federal corporate law and an 
increased federal role in corporate governance.102 Indeed, shareholders 
and firms themselves might be indifferent to the prospect of litigating 
corporate law claims in federal courts rather than state courts. To the 
 
 100 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).  
Under § 1407, Congress gave the Panel broad powers to transfer groups of 
cases to a single district court for the purpose of conducting pretrial 
proceedings without consideration for personal jurisdiction over the parties 
and without having to meet the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 . . 
.The Panel considers only two issues in resolving transfer motions under § 
1407 in new dockets. First, the Panel considers whether common questions 
of fact among several pending civil actions exist such that centralization of 
those actions in a single district will further the convenience of the parties 
and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions. 
Second, the Panel considers which federal district and judge are best situated 
to handle the transferred matters. In deciding those issues, the Panel 
exercises its considerable and largely unfettered discretion within the unique 
circumstances that each motion presents. 
John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 
2227-28 (2002). 
 101 See Heyburn, supra note 100, at 2229. 
 102 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992) 
(advocating an expansion of federal regulation to govern the problem of managerial 
opportunism); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate 
Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004) (arguing that the threat of federalization of 
corporate law is valuable for ensuring robust development of corporate law at the state 
level); Roberta S. Karmel, Is it Time for a Federal Corporate Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55 
(1991) (suggesting that policymakers revisit the question of federal corporate law); 
Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 
783 (1993) (arguing for an increased federal role in corporate governance); Joel 
Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947 
(1990) (arguing for a minimal level of federal intervention in corporate law). 
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extent the federal courts provide a forum and a mechanism for 
efficiently adjudicating competing claims and making determinations 
about the identity of lead plaintiffs, shareholders and firms might well 
prefer litigating in federal courts. 
Of course, federalizing the adjudication of state corporate law poses 
an immediate threat to Delaware’s dominant position with respect to 
corporate law. Consequently, neither Delaware policymakers nor 
Delaware’s chief advocates in Congress can be expected to support 
elimination of the Delaware carve-out. Absent a congressional 
mandate, the federal courts are unlikely to intervene on their own.103 
Congress has not revisited the question of a federal corporate law in 
some time.104 Absent advocacy in Congress for a change with respect 
to the role of federal courts, it is unlikely that Congress will consider 
federalization in the near future. The most obvious candidate to 
advocate on behalf of such a change is Delaware and its supporters in 
Congress. It is highly unlikely, however, that in an effort to address 
the problem of the out-of-Delaware trend that any Delaware 
policymakers would actually promote federalization of the 
adjudication of corporate law questions as a solution. 
D. Interstate MDL Panel 
Rather than rely on the federal MDL Panel, Delaware might promote 
a more formal relationship among the states that receive the most 
shareholder litigation: New York, California, and Texas. Interstate 
compacts exist for a number of reasons, including establishment of 
administrative agencies to resolve interstate resource management 
issues, public transportation, and economic development.105 In rare 
cases, states enter into interstate agreements to settle litigation, as was 
the case with the 1998 master tobacco litigation settlement.106 A 
formal interstate compact could mimic, at the state level, the work of 
the federal MDL Panel by establishing a state-level panel on multistate 
 
 103 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear 
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial 
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, 
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be 
overridden.”). 
 104 See Karmel, supra note 102, at 57-62 (providing a brief history of federal 
corporate law efforts). 
 105 See Jill E. Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of 
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997); see also Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, 
and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (2003).  
 106 See Greve, supra note 105, at 348. 
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litigation, including shareholder litigation.107 This state-level panel 
would be empowered to help resolve in a uniform manner the knotty 
question of which plaintiff amongst competing plaintiffs should 
control the litigation. Such a panel would also be responsible for 
deciding the appropriate forum for the resolution of intracorporate 
disputes. It is likely that such a panel would have a bias in favor of 
sending claims, particularly those with the most interesting legal 
issues, back to the Delaware judiciary for resolution. This would 
ensure that the state of incorporation controls the development of its 
own corporate law while constraining agency costs. 
Establishing a state-level panel to resolve questions of forum for 
intracorporate disputes might be a high priority for Delaware 
policymakers and the Delaware Bar.108 At this point, however, only 
Delaware has a real stake in resolving the out-of-Delaware problem in 
its favor. Other states have little incentive to expend political or 
administrative capital to resolve a problem affecting only Delaware. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that an interstate MDL could realistically 
garner sufficient support to proceed. 
III. THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM PROVISION 
Unlike the above approaches, the exclusive forum provision in 
corporate charters is a viable mechanism for addressing the out-of-
Delaware problem.109 The exclusive forum provision creates a judicial 
presumption that shareholder litigation alleging violations of fiduciary 
duties on the part of the board, or asserting any rights under the 
corporate charter, be litigated exclusively in the state of incorporation. 
Because the provision reduces the incentive for plaintiffs’ counsel to 
engage in forum shopping, it is likely a value-enhancing charter 
amendment. Were such provisions widely adopted and regularly 
enforced by foreign jurisdictions, the exclusive forum provision could 
 
 107 Interstate compacts are permitted with the consent of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 10, cl. 3. (Compacts Clause). 
 108 Messrs. Lebovitch, Silk, and Friedman, all prominent members of the Delaware 
plaintiff’s bar, advocate for a state-level system of determining control over 
multiforum litigation. See MARK LEBOVITCH, JERRY SILK & JEREMY FRIEDMAN, MAKING 
ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION IN 
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER-RELATED LITIGATION 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.blbglaw.com/misc_files/ MakingOrderoutofChaos. 
 109 See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960-961 (Del. Ch. 2010); 
Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 4, 64; Mirvis, supra note 1, at 
17-18; Lewis, supra note 1, at 202-03; Stevelman, supra note 1, at 65; see also 
Grundfest, supra note 1, at 3, 8, 20.  
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help reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to race to courthouses outside of 
Delaware after announcements of mergers or corporate sales. 
An exclusive forum provision provides defendants the ability to 
have a state-law based derivative suit or a shareholder class action 
brought in a court outside the state of incorporation dismissed.110 
Currently, defendants in foreign jurisdictions may typically seek a stay 
or dismissal only as a matter of judicial discretion. Foreign courts will 
often accommodate such motions in the interests of comity and 
judicial efficiency.111 However, not all courts will do so.112 In 
jurisdictions that follow a strict interpretation of the first-filed 
doctrine, courts may be hesitant to exercise their discretion to defer to 
second-filed cases in another jurisdiction.113 The exclusive forum 
provision affords defendants in foreign courts procedural 
opportunities to cut short the competition amongst plaintiffs’ counsels 
and to have litigation in foreign courts dismissed or stayed in favor of 
litigation in the state of incorporation. 
 
 110 The language adopted by Netsuite Inc. in its 2007 Certificate of Incorporation 
provides a useful example of an exclusive forum provision. The Netsuite provision 
reads as follows: 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative 
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and 
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on 
behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a 
fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any 
action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL, or 
(iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. 
Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in 
shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of 
and consented to the provisions of this Article [. . . ]. 
NETSUITE INC., AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, art. VI.8 
(2007). Professor Grundfest identifies the language used by Netsuite as part of the 
“Grundfest Cluster” of firms adopting exclusive forum provisions. Grundfest traces 
the origin of this language to language used by Oracle in its bylaws and subsequently 
to Financial Engines, Inc. Grundfest was a member of board of directors of both 
Oracle and Financial Engines. See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 3. 
 111 For example, in the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Litigation, the Texas based 
litigation was ultimately stayed in favor of the Delaware litigation. See Letter from 
Raymond DiCamillio to Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster, supra note 22. 
 112 See, e.g., In re The Topps Co. S’holder Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882, 
*7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (refusing to defer to contemporaneously-filed litigation in 
Delaware). 
 113 Id. at 3 (noting approvingly fact that plaintiff in New York court had filed his 
claim in extremely rapid fashion thus indicating his zeal to litigate matter). 
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To the extent acquisition-related litigation in foreign jurisdictions 
represents a tax on transactions, excessive litigation can be a 
deadweight loss to society. Transaction-related litigation that does not 
result in higher prices being paid to shareholders but does result in the 
payment of attorneys’ fees and some nominal disclosures may simply 
represent litigation agency costs.114 The settlement costs of 
transaction-related litigation are directly and indirectly borne by 
shareholders of the selling firm. Therefore, shareholders have an 
incentive to reduce the amount of litigation while still subjecting 
important corporate transactions to some degree of judicial review.115 
By limiting litigation to a single forum, firms and shareholders can still 
subject themselves to review, but in the case of Delaware, also benefit 
from the court’s interest in policing litigation agency costs. 
Limiting plaintiffs’ access to foreign courts is, in the short-term, in 
the best interests of policymakers who are interested in protecting 
Delaware’s dominant position with respect to corporate law. 
Widespread adoption of exclusive forum provisions in corporate 
charters would assure that Delaware maintains an adequate “flow” of 
cases to its courts.116 A constant flow of cases assures Delaware of 
control over the maintenance and development of its corporate law 
and thus its dominate position as a national standard for the corporate 
law. However, such a move does not come without potential 
consequences over the long-term.117 
A. Enforceability 
Although limiting access to foreign forums may be an attractive 
proposition to shareholders and firms, enforceability of exclusive 
forum provisions is controversial.118 Since the early the 1970s in 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., U.S. courts have adopted a deferential 
attitude toward exclusive forum provisions included in contracts.119 
 
 114 Thompson & Thomas, supra note 2, at 135 (describing litigation agency costs). 
For an example of litigation agency costs as they relate to disclosure-only litigation, 
see In re Sauer-Danfoss S’holders Litig., No. 5162-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64, at *2-
4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011). 
 115 Of course, the collective action problems inhibit shareholders from monitoring 
plaintiff counsel directly. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 51 (discussing 
collective action problem that inhibits shareholder monitoring of plaintiff counsel). 
 116 See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 1, at 44 (noting 
importance of “flow” of cases to maintain and develop corporate common law). 
 117 For discussion of potential risks, see infra Part V. 
 118 See sources cited supra note 12. 
 119 This deference even includes when such provisions are included in the “fine 
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Nevertheless, the question of whether courts will accept application of 
the exclusive forum provision in the corporate setting is still 
unresolved. Based on the reasoning in Galaviz v. Berg as well as past 
practice with respect to the enforcement of forum provisions, it is 
likely that an exclusive forum provision in a certificate of 
incorporation, or adopted as an amendment to a certificate of 
incorporation, is enforceable.120 
In Bremen, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the presumptive 
validity of forum selection clauses. 121 In order to overcome the 
presumption of enforceability, the objecting party must first establish: 
“(i) it is a result of fraud or overreaching; (ii) enforcement would 
violate a strong public policy of the forum; or (iii) enforcement would, 
in the particular circumstances of the case, result in litigation in a 
jurisdiction so seriously inconvenient as to be unreasonable.”122 Since 
Bremen, contracting parties and courts are comfortable relying on 
exclusive forum provisions in contracts.123 State courts are also 
generally willing to enforce choice of forum provisions in the context 
of contractual disputes.124 
 
print” in a take-it-or-leave contract. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-
10 (1972) (overturning traditional “ouster doctrine” in favor of deference to 
contractual choices with respect to location of appropriate forum). 
 120 See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172-75 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (analyzing 
charter provision or amendment to charter approved by majority of shareholders 
differently from unilaterally adopted bylaw). 
 121 See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8; see also Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 
(1988) (“Though state policies should be weighed in the balance, the authority and 
prerogative of the federal courts to determine the issue, as Congress has directed by § 
1404(a), should be exercised so that a valid forum-selection clause is given controlling 
weight in all but the most exceptional cases.”). 
 122 See Hadley v. Shaffer, No. Civ.A. 99-144-JJF, 2003 WL 21960406, at *4 (D. Del. 
2003); see also Aveta, Inc. v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 607 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citing 
HealthTrio, Inc. v. Margules, No. 06C-04-196, 2007 WL 544156, at *3 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 2007)). 
 123 This is also true where parties are entering into contracts involving corporate 
acquisitions. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431625 (finding that during period of 2004–2008, more 
than 60% of merger agreements in sample selected Delaware as exclusive forum for 
disputes related to agreement); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex 
Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978, 1988 (2006) (analyzing data from 2002 suggesting flight 
from Delaware choice of law and forum in merger agreements). 
 124 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (acknowledging 
that although not historically favored, forum selection clause post-Bremen are prima 
facie valid).  
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Following Bremen, Delaware, Texas, New York, and California have 
all accepted the presumption of enforceability for forum provisions in 
contracts with limited restrictions.125 In Delaware, forum selection 
clauses are “presumptively valid and have been regularly enforced.”126 
Texas also looks favorably on forum selection clauses in contracts and 
generally gives them “full effect . . . absent a strong showing that 
[they] should be set aside.”127 For their part, New York courts have 
found forum selection provisions to be “prima facie valid.”128 New 
York courts are inclined to enforce choice of forum provisions agreed 
to by parties in contract even when such an election works to the 
detriment of citizens of New York.129 Finally, California courts 
 
 125 See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. 
 126 Capital Grp. Cos. v. Armour, No. Civ.A 422-N, 2004 WL 2521295, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 3, 2004); see also In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 961 n.8 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (noting in dicta the likelihood that Delaware courts would enforce 
forum selection provisions in corporate charters); Green Isle Partners, Ltd. v. Ritz-
Carlton Hotel Co., No. 18416, 2000 WL 1788655, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2000). But see 
Aveta, Inc. v. Colon, 942 A. 2d 603, 607-11 (Del. Ch. 2008) (ruling that despite 
contract with Delaware forum selection, the forum was inconvenient for both the 
court as well as the plaintiff because the plaintiff had no contacts with Delaware, the 
issue was based on Puerto Rican law, and the plaintiff spoke no English and did not 
understand what he was signing). 
 127 In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 117 (Tex. 2004) (“[s]ubjecting a party to 
trial in a forum other than that agreed upon and requiring an appeal to vindicate the 
rights granted in a forum-selection clause is clear harassment” that injures not just the 
non-breaching party, but the broader judicial system, injecting inefficiency by 
enabling forum shopping, wasting judicial resources, delaying adjudication on the 
merits, and skewing settlement dynamics contrary to the parties’ contracted-for 
expectations. Accordingly, forum selection clauses — like arbitration agreements — 
can be enforced through mandamus); see also In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 
668 (Tex. 2007) (enforcing Florida forum selection clause “unless the opposing party 
clearly shows that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the clause is 
invalid for reasons such as fraud or overreaching”). 
 128 British W. Indies Guar. Trust Co., v. Banque Internationale A Luxembourg, 172 
A.D.2d 234, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“It is well-accepted policy that forum 
selection clauses are prima facie valid. In order to set aside such a clause, a party must 
show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause is invalid 
because of fraud or overreaching, such that a trial in the contractual forum would be 
so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the challenging party would, for all practical 
purposes, be deprived of his or her day in court.”). 
 129 See Boss v. Am. Express Fin., 844 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (2006) (“We express no 
opinion on the merits of plaintiffs’ argument. It could and should have been made to a 
court in Minnesota — the forum the parties chose by contract. If New York’s interest 
in applying its own law to this transaction is as powerful as plaintiffs contend, we 
cannot assume that Minnesota courts would ignore it, any more than we would ignore 
the interests or policies of the State of Minnesota where they were implicated. In 
short, objections to a choice of law clause are not a warrant for failure to enforce a 
choice of forum clause.”). 
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presumptively enforce forum selection clauses unless the plaintiff 
seeking to defeat such a clause can show that enforcement of the 
clause would be unreasonable or might deprive the litigants of 
substantive rights already available to them under California law.130 
While forum selection provisions are presumptively valid in contract 
before state and federal courts throughout the United States, this 
presumption is generally subject to reasonable limitations.131 
Although the presumptive validity of forum selection clauses in 
contracts is well established, the validity of exclusive forum provisions 
in certificates of incorporation is still relatively uncertain. If courts 
accept the construct of the corporate charter as a contract, then there 
is reason to believe that they will regularly enforce such provisions. 
The legal academy has long analyzed the corporate charter as a 
voluntary contract among the corporation, managers, and 
shareholders.132 Courts have — for longer than the academy — 
recognized the essential contractual nature of the corporate charter.133 
Delaware and other states also view shareholder rights delineated in a 
corporate charter as contractual in nature.134 For example, in Air 
 
 130 See Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 907-08 (Ct. App. 
1992) (“Given the importance of forum selection clauses, both the United States 
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have placed a heavy burden on a 
plaintiff seeking to defeat such a clause, requiring it to demonstrate that enforcement 
of the clause would be unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.”); see also 
Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1992) (holding that 
an arm’s length choice-of-law provision between commercial entities will not be 
enforced if it violates a fundamental California public policy and California has 
materially greater interests than the chosen state); Miller-Leigh LLC v. Henson, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 86-87 (Ct. App. 2007) (same). But see Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 708 (Ct. App. 2001) (“California courts will refuse to 
defer to the selected forum if to do so would substantially diminish the rights of 
California residents in a way that violates our state’s public policy.” The California 
Supreme Court refused to enforce a forum selection clause that would have sent class 
action litigation to Virginia, a state that does not recognize the validity of class actions 
with respect to consumer protection).  
 131 See sources cited supra note 121. 
 132 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (applying contract metaphor to corporate charter). 
 133 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 592 (1819) (“The charter 
. . . is a contract within in the meaning of that clause of the constitution of the United 
States.”); see also Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. 369, 382 
(1854) (taking it as “well settled” that charter of private corporation is in nature of 
contract between State and corporation); Korzen v. Local Union 705, 75 F.3d 285, 288 
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the corporate charter is a contract and that breach of the 
charter is a “straightforward claim for breach of contract under state common law”).  
 134 See, e.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. Ch. 
1944) (finding that shareholder rights are contract rights); Morris v Am. Pub. Util. 
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Products and Chemicals Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., Chancellor Chandler noted 
that “[c]orporate charters . . . are contracts among the shareholders of 
a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation are held 
to apply.”135 Therefore, courts will likely approach analysis of an 
exclusive forum provision in a corporate charter in the same way they 
apply forum provisions in contracts — subject to the same 
constraints.136 
A recent case tested the enforceability of exclusive forum provisions 
in corporate bylaws.137 In Galaviz v. Berg, the plaintiff brought a 
derivative claim against the board members of Oracle Corporation in a 
California federal court.138 The complaint alleged that the board 
violated its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders 
when it permitted the company to overbill the government, resulting 
in harm to the corporation.139 The board moved to dismiss in order for 
the claim to be heard in Delaware. The basis for this motion was a 
corporate bylaw adopted unilaterally by the board that purported to 
limit the forum for bringing any derivative claims on behalf of the 
corporation to the Chancery Court in Delaware.140 The plaintiffs 
argued that enforcement of the bylaw discouraged the pursuit of 
derivative claims and deprived the plaintiffs of the substantial 
protections of California law. The Galaviz court found that the 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that moving the case to Delaware 
would deny them of any substantial justice, but nevertheless denied 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.141 According to the court, the 
forum bylaw failed an essential test of contract — the lack of assent.142 
 
Co., 122 A. 696 (Del. Ch.1923) (noting that corporate charter is contract); 
Casumpang v. ILWU, Local 142, 13 P.3d 1235 (Haw. 2000) (holding that corporate 
charter is contract); Sutter v. Sutter Ranching Corp., 14 P.3d 58, 64 n.25 (Okla. 2000) 
(holding that corporate charter is contract); Nat. Bd. of Exam. v. Am. Osteopathic 
Ass’n, 645 N.E.2d 608, 617 (Ind. 1994) (noting contractual relationship between 
stockholders and corporation in non-profit corporation); AP Smith Mfg. Co. v. 
Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 588 (N.J. 1953) (noting contractual relationship between 
stockholders and corporation, and between stockholders inter se). 
 135 See also Airgas, Inc. v Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) 
(citing Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990)). 
 136 Lewis conducts an extensive review of the literature and concludes that 
California courts would determine in most circumstances that exclusive forum 
provisions in corporate charters are enforceable. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 199-200. 
 137 Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 138 Id. at 1171. 
 139 Galaviz is not a typical acquisition-related lawsuit. Id. at 1171-72. 
 140 Id. at 1171. 
 141 Id. at 1173-75. 
 142 Id. at 1174. 
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Because the board unilaterally adopted the bylaw after the alleged bad 
act, the bylaw lacked sufficient assent to form a contract.143 Had the 
forum provision been adopted by the shareholders as a bylaw or 
included in the corporate charter before the violation, the court would 
have reached a different conclusion.144 
Of course, the typical contract claim implicating an exclusive forum 
provision differs from shareholder lawsuits in important ways. In the 
typical contract case, the plaintiff seeking to vindicate its rights is a 
citizen of the state where the case is brought, and the court has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In such cases, the court will 
have a strong policy interest in assuring that the citizen-plaintiff who 
brought the suit is able to vindicate her rights. Notwithstanding the 
strong policy interest in protecting the rights of their own citizens, 
courts regularly defer to choice of forum provisions in contract 
disputes and order stays or dismissals in favor of foreign 
proceedings.145 In shareholder lawsuits, however, the plaintiff is not 
necessarily a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought.146 
Shareholders are often widely dispersed throughout the economy; the 
class as a whole often “has no cognizable interest in having a court of 
another state adjudicate a claim involving” the corporate law of the 
state of incorporation.147 When claims are filed in both the state of 
incorporation and a second state, there may be little policy 
justification, other than the fact that the case in the foreign 
jurisdiction is first-filed (sometimes by only hours), to justify why it 
should not be stayed in favor of claims filed by other shareholder 
plaintiffs in the state of incorporation. A first-filing in a foreign 
jurisdiction does not carry with it a logical presumption that litigation 
in state of incorporation is inconvenient for the shareholder class or 
 
 143 The Oracle bylaw states: “9.07 Derivative Action: The sole and exclusive forum 
for any actual or purported derivative action brought on behalf of the Corporation 
shall be the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware.” Oracle Corp., Amended and 
Restated Bylaws 9 (July 26, 2006) available at http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/ 
investor-relations/bylaws-176730.pdf. 
 144 Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that corporate bylaw 
unilaterally adopted by the board lacks necessary shareholder consent). 
 145 New York will enforce forum and choice of law provisions even if it results in 
fewer legal protections for the citizen plaintiffs. California, on the other hand, will 
refuse to give selection and choice of law provisions force if the result is a diminution 
of substantive legal rights available to California plaintiffs under California law.  
 146 In Topps, the shareholder plaintiff was an Ohio resident who brought the claim 
against a Delaware corporation in the New York courts. Topps Co. was headquartered 
in New York. See In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 961 (Del. Ch. 
2007).  
 147 Id. at 961. 
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the corporation (in the case of a derivative suit), though it might be 
for the purported class representative.148 These differences favor 
enforcement by foreign courts of the exclusive forum provision in 
shareholder lawsuits. 
It is not necessary for courts to uniformly enforce such provisions 
for them to be valuable to firms. Adoption of exclusive forum 
provisions in certificates of incorporation may be a useful avenue for 
reducing the incentive for plaintiff counsel to engage in forum 
shopping. To the extent exclusive forum provisions reduce those 
incentives, forum selection provisions may be valuable additions from 
the point of view of shareholders as well as Delaware policymakers. 
B. Paucity of Adoptions 
Firms are reluctant to adopt exclusive forum provisions in corporate 
charters despite the obvious utility. The enabling character of 
corporate law makes it possible for firms to tailor the content of their 
corporate charters in many ways, including the inclusion of a forum 
selection provision.149 Nevertheless, few firms have done so. Of the 
430 Delaware firms filing for initial public offerings (“IPOs”) during 
2010, only twenty-one (4.9%) included an exclusive forum provision 
in their corporate charters.150 During 2010, a number of high profile 
Delaware firms went public, including Toys “R” Us, Inc., General 
Motors Company, and Tesla Motors, Inc.151 None of these firms 
included an exclusive forum provision in their corporate charters 
 
 148 A shareholder class representative who argues that litigation in the state of 
incorporation is inconvenient may not be capable of providing adequate 
representation for the class.  
 149 Delaware Code title 8, section 102(b)(1) permits for the inclusion of: 
(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of 
the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting 
and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the 
stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or the governing body, 
members, or any class or group of members of a nonstock corporation; if 
such provisions are not contrary to the laws of [Delaware]. 
 150 See Appendix B. Grundfest identifies 39 exclusive forum provisions in corporate 
charters and bylaws. For reasons raised in Galaviz, I do not investigate the adoption of 
exclusive forum bylaws. See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 9. SEC filings analyzed 
include that of Howard Hughes Corp., a spin off from General Properties. If one 
counts those two offerings as a single offering, then the number of firms electing to 
include exclusive forum provisions drops to 20 of 4294, or 4.7%. 
 151 General Motors Co., Prospectus (Form S-1) (August 18, 2010); Tesla Motors, 
Inc., Prospectus (Form S-1) (May 25, 2010); Toys “R” Us, Inc., Prospectus (Form S-1) 
(May 28, 2010). 
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of firms, including Oracle, appear to have taken a cue in adopting 
forum provisions in charters and corporate bylaws from Professor 
Grundfest, who began discussing this issue and promoting the 
exclusive forum provision in the second half of 2010.154 Both of these 
stimuli are important contributors to a potential information cascade 
that may effect the willingness of managers and shareholders to adopt 
an exclusive forum provision.155 Notwithstanding the recent attention 
made possible by the Delaware court decision and the works of 
important corporate governance scholars, the failure of firms to more 
widely adopt a value enhancing amendment is confusing. 
IV. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND INSIGHTS TO THE ADOPTION 
PROBLEM 
The hesitancy of firms to adopt the exclusive forum provision in 
spite of its obvious utility presents a puzzle. The reluctance of firms to 
adopt value-enhancing exclusive form provisions at an IPO suggests 
there may be market failures. Those market failures can, at least in 
part, be explained by the work of behavioral economics. Behavioral 
economics also suggests a number of potential prescriptions for 
overcoming status quo bias including both default rules and opt-in 
menus. Although parties are permitted to negotiate around default 
terms, opt-out default rules are often adopted as “quasi-immutable” 
standard terms.156 Menus (“opt-in” rules) can play a similar role in the 
establishment of standard terms while avoiding some of the status quo 
bias that accompanies either the absence or presence of a default rule. 
 
 154 Professor Grundfest has called the firms associated with his advice to adopt 
forum provisions the “Grundfest cluster.” See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 3. Professor 
Grundfest was a director of Oracle as well as Financial Engines; both firms have 
adopted a version of the exclusive forum provision. See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 3; 
see also Steven Davidoff, A Litigation Plan that Would Favor Delaware, Dealbook, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/a-litigation-
plan-that-would-favor-delaware/ (describing Professor Grundfest’s proposal that firms 
adopt exclusive forum provisions). In promoting adoption of the exclusive forum 
provision, Prof. Grundfest is acting as a standards entrepreneur, or “informational 
cascade facilitator.” See Robert J. Shiller, Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior, 
85 AM. ECON. REV. 181, 185 (1995). 
 155 An information cascade occurs “when [it becomes] optimal for an individual, 
having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the 
preceding individual without regard to his own information.” Sushil Bikchandani, 
David Hirschleiferet & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural 
Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 994 (1992). 
 156 Professor Korobkin coined term “quasi-immutable” with respect to default 
terms in contracts. Russell B. Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default 
Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 665 (1997) [hereinafter Status Quo Bias]. 
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While menus do not encourage highly idiosyncratic customization of 
charter terms, they do encourage parties to consider and engage in 
some degree of customization of charter terms. How a decision is 
framed affects the outcome; in the words of Professor Ian Ayres, 
“menus matter”.157 A new section 102(b)(8) menu of the Delaware 
Code may help overcome status quo bias in contracting and facilitate 
the widespread adoption of this value-enhancing charter provision. 
The dominant framework for understanding corporate law is the 
efficient market model that envisions corporations as contractual in 
nature.158 This framework makes a number of assumptions about 
human behavior — perfect information, rational preferences that can 
be valued, and self-interestedness — that provide an elegant 
framework for analyzing human behavior with respect to 
contracting.159 In Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase posited that 
when the assumptions of the efficient market model hold, the initial 
distribution of entitlements should not matter as parties will 
eventually bargain to reach an efficient outcome or one market actor’s 
preference is maximized.160 This contractarian model endorses an 
approach to corporate law that assumes shareholders will bargain for 
the most efficient arrangement of rules governing the allocation and 
use of capital in the firm.161 
The contractarian model often turns out to be a poor predictor of 
the behavior of real people who tend to stray from the model’s 
assumptions. Cognitive psychologists observe predictable patterns of 
departure in controlled experiments.162 Real people differ from our 
assumptions in the market model in a number of key respects. First, 
people are said to be “boundedly rational.”163 This refers to fact that 
 
 157 Professor Ayres notes that “[m]erely by changing the default, lawmakers — 
courts and legislators — can affect the equilibrium.” See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 (2006). 
 158 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) 
(observing that the firm is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus of contractual 
relationships). 
 159 Professor Thaler has given the man of the efficient market the moniker “homo 
economicus”. See RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE 34 (1992). 
 160 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2-4 (1960). 
 161 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (arguing that shareholders will bargain for the most 
efficient set of corporate rules). 
 162 For a representative sample of experimental results from cognitive psychology, 
see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23-84 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds, 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER CERTAINTY].  
 163 See Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality, in UTILITY AND PROBABILITY 15 (John 
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people have a limited capacity to absorb and process information;164 
consequently, real people will often rely on “rules of thumb” or 
heuristics to assist in their decision-making processes.165 Second, real 
people have limited willpower and depart from their long-term self-
interests.166 Dieters and smokers can attest that real people’s rational 
preferences are not stable, but change with time and circumstances.167 
Finally, real people regularly demonstrate characteristics of altruism 
and fairness.168 The results of these limitations are regular deviations 
from results predicted by the efficient market model.169 Together, 
these deviations in human behavior from the model can help us 
understand why, despite the apparent efficiency enhancing aspects of 
exclusive forum provisions, firms have not adopted such provisions. 
In particular, endowments, a concept derived from behavioral 
economics, appear to matter. Where one starts often dictates the final 
result. Consequently, how decisions are framed, including the 
decision whether to include an exclusive forum provision in a 
corporate charter, can affect the outcome. 
In their well-known experiment illustrating the “endowment effect,” 
Professors Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler observed how individuals 
demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to pay 
for it.170 The professors randomly distributed mugs (valued at 
approximately $6) to students in a classroom. They designated 
students with mugs as sellers and students without mugs as buyers. 
 
Eatwell et al. eds., 1990); see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003). 
 164 Simon, supra note 163 (taking into account cognitive limitations of decision-
makers). 
 165 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162, at 3-4. 
 166 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 14-16 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 
2000). 
 167 Id. at 15. 
 168 Id.  
 169 These deviations have been recognized by other observers. For example, 
Professor Greenfield recognized the significant deviations that actual corporate 
contracting takes from the efficient contractarian ideal resulting corporate contracts 
that fail to reflect the true preferences of the parties. See Kent Greenfield, Using 
Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory 
Tool, 35 UC DAVIS L. REV. 581, 584-86. (2001). 
 170 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 160-163 
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). Thaler coined the term “endowment 
effect.” See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). 
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Although the market model predicts that through a series of market 
transactions the mugs should end up in the hands of those who value 
them the most, this was not the observed outcome.171 Students who 
randomly received the mugs systematically demanded more than 
buyers were willing to pay for them, preventing the expected trades 
from occurring;172 participants immediately changed their valuations 
of the mug once they added it to their own “endowment”.173 This well-
known experiment demonstrates that human preferences are not 
stable.174 The observed change in valuation preferences is a 
manifestation of loss aversion: the disutility of giving something up 
once it has been added to one’s endowment is greater than the utility 
of acquiring it.175 Once parties add an object to their endowment, 
“[T]he disadvantages of a change [in the status quo] loom larger than 
its advantages.”176 This asymmetry with respect to the value of losses 
leads to reinforcement of the status quo, or a “status quo bias.”177 
Endowments are observable not only in objects; people demonstrate 
similar endowments across a range of scenarios, including in the 
context of contracting.178 Although one logically does not expect to see 
people demonstrate similar entitlements towards contractual terms 
during negotiations, they do. In the process of negotiating contract 
terms, one might expect parties to negotiate to optimal results 
notwithstanding the presence of a default rule or standard form 
provision in a contract. Korobkin conducted experiments to test 
whether the presence of a standard form provision in a contract 
resulted in any evidence of an endowment effect with respect to those 
terms.179 He found that they did.180 
 
 171 See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162, at 1330-33. 
 172 See id.; see also Kahneman et al., supra note 15, at 197-98. 
 173 See sources cited supra note 172. 
 174 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice, in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 143, 145 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000). 
 175 See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 162, at 1326. These results are 
robust and have been confirmed by multiple experimental studies.  
 176 Kahneman et al., supra note 15, at 200.  
 177 Id. 
 178 See Russell B. Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1271 (2003); Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract 
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1583, 1586 (1998) [hereinafter Psychological Power] Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, supra 
note 156, at 656. 
 179 See Korobkin, Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, supra note 178, at 1274; 
Korobkin, Psychological Power, supra note 178, at 1605; Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, 
supra note 156, at 633-37. 
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In his experiments, Korobkin asked participants to play the role of 
attorneys representing a fictitious overnight carrier in a contract 
negotiation. Participants were given a variety of scenarios along with 
default terms that would govern in the absence of explicit 
contracting.181 Subjects were then asked to express their preference for 
contract terms that deviated from the stated default term.182 If the 
negotiating parties did not demonstrate an endowment effect with 
respect to default rules in contract negotiations, one would expect 
parties to regularly depart from the default term approximately fifty 
percent of the time and not show a significant preference for what was 
essentially a randomly determined default rule.183 In fact, the subjects 
demonstrated a preference for the default term governing the parties’ 
relationship more than seventy-five percent of the time.184 When told 
that particular terms were default terms, parties tended not to depart 
from the default rule, irrespective of the content of those defaults.185 
Korobkin identified this bias towards default rules as a manifestation 
of the endowment effect.186 
When parties are faced with a choice to either accept a default rule 
or negotiate around the existing default rule, parties generally accept 
the default as a means to minimize costs regardless of the rule’s 
substance.187 A recent study of opt-in default rules by Professor 
Listokin examined opt-in provisions in corporate charters and found 
evidence of status quo bias with respect to the exclusion and inclusion 
of fair price provisions (state antitakeover provisions).188 Parties are 
not likely to negotiate fair price provisions on their own. Listokin 
found that when the default rule is silent with respect to the inclusion 
 
 180 See Korobkin, Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, supra note 178, at 1274; 
Korobkin, Psychological Power, supra note 178, at 1605; Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, 
supra note 156, at 640. 
 181 Korobkin, Status Quo Bias, supra note 156, at 631-35. 
 182 Subjects were asked to express these preferences in terms of their maximum 
willingness to pay to deviate from the contract default as well as their minimum 
willingness to accept in order to convince them to deviate from the contract default. 
See id. at 636.  
 183 Id. at 631-35. 
 184 Different groups were assigned to different default rules, thus ensuring that 
during negotiations the content of the default rule the overall results. See id. at 644. 
 185 See id. at 631. 
 186 See id. at 631 (noting the illusory nature of endowment effect in contract 
negotiations). 
 187 See Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, in CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 170, at 280-81. 
 188 Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical 
Examination, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279, 284 (2009). 
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of fair price provisions only twenty percent of firms include them in 
their corporate charters at IPOs.189 On the other hand, where fair price 
provisions are the default rule and parties are required to opt-out of 
them, ninety-eight percent of firms include them in their corporate 
charters at IPOs.190 Finally, where fair price provisions are available in 
the forum of an opt-in menu, fifty-six percent of firms elect to include 
them.191 The presence or absence of a default rule in the corporate 
code appears to result in an endowment effect influencing negotiations 
over the content of corporate charters.192 
Professors Kahan and Klausner observed a similar pattern in the 
content of corporate charters.193 Kahan and Klausner noted that 
adherence to standard form terms in corporate charters resulted in a 
high degree of uniformity and herd behavior with respect to the 
content of corporate charters.194 Although parties are free to tailor 
their corporate contracts, they regularly opt not to and instead adopt 
“plain vanilla” charters that rely heavily on default rules.195 Kahan and 
Klausner attribute the high degree of uniformity to the network 
benefits of standardization of corporate terms.196 However, it is equally 
likely that status quo bias plays an important role in the process of 
selecting contractual terms.197 Kahan and Klausner recognize that in 
the process of contracting, although “parties have no formal property 
(or other) rights in a standard term, the standard terms form an 
 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 
347, 361 (1996); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 822 (1995) [hereinafter Corporations]. 
 194 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 193, at 361; Klausner,,supra note 193, at 822. 
 195 For an example of a typical corporate charter, see the corporate charter of eBay 
Inc. eBay Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, (Form S-1) (July 15, 1998). 
 196 Kahan & Klausner note that the presence of network benefits can also inhibit 
innovation and generate contractual inertia that permits suboptimal terms to persist 
over time. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 193, at 349, 361; see also Klausner, 
Corporations, supra note 193, at 790. Professors Kahan and Klausner found similar 
results when investigating corporate indentures. See Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics 
of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 726 (1997). 
 197 Klausner observes that “when network externalities are present, we cannot rely 
on the market to select optimal terms initially.” Klausner, Corporations, 193, at 808. 
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expectational baseline” akin to the endowment effect.198 The result is a 
bias against innovation in corporate contracting.199 
One can observe status quo bias in still other areas of corporate law. 
Contractual inertia plays an important role in preserving Delaware’s 
dominant position with respect to incorporations. Prior to an IPO of 
stock, the vast majority of firms are incorporated in their home 
states.200 The IPO provides firms an opportunity to change the location 
of their incorporation. Professor Daines studied the incorporation 
choices of firms at the IPO stage and found that ninety-seven percent 
of firms elected to incorporate either in Delaware or in their home 
state.201 Ninety-five percent of firms that elected to incorporate in a 
state other than their home state selected Delaware.202 Rather than 
there being a vigorous competition amongst states for incorporations 
of firms at the IPO stage, what appears to happen is that at the IPO, 
firms will elect to reincorporate in Delaware, presumably following 
advice given by their counsel, or they will remain incorporated in their 
home state.203 Daines describes the competition for incorporations not 
as a nationwide market but as a series of “linked duopolies, or two-
way run-offs between Delaware and other states.”204 Daines attributes 
this result to a “home state bias.”205 The most likely reason for this 
pattern of incorporations relates to selection of counsel and counsel’s 
inertia with respect to their contracting patterns.206 Daines suggests 
that firms hiring local counsel for their IPO will likely end up with 
local incorporations, while firms hiring national counsel will likely 
end up re-incorporating in Delaware.207 
 
 198 See Kahan & Klausner, 193, at 361. 
 199 See id. at 362. 
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Although reliance on plain vanilla corporate charters with relatively 
little tailoring may simplify the process of charter formation, such 
charters do not guarantee firms will systematically adopt efficient 
terms. Status quo bias may be responsible for deterring efficient 
innovation. Take, for example, the incorporation decision to use an 
IPO law firm. Typically law firms assign the drafting of the corporate 
charter in the IPO to a junior attorney or paralegal working off a form 
charter. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Forms and 
Commentary provides examples of form charters often used by IPO 
firms.208 The Delaware model charter offered by the ABA is a plain 
vanilla form with few proposed opportunities for tailoring.209 Junior 
legal professionals working from these forms face a high degree of 
asymmetry in payoffs between modifying the standard form for 
improved efficiency, but risking mistakes and keeping the standard 
form with its inefficiencies and ensuring no mistakes. If an ex post 
review finds that the innovations were costly to clients, the lawyer 
responsible may face severe professional consequences. On the other 
hand, the personal benefits of innovating are limited. As a result of 
this asymmetry, legal professionals drafting of IPO charters almost 
exclusively follow the standard form. 
It is not just junior legal professionals who face an asymmetry in 
potential payoffs. A law firm that advises its clients to depart from the 
standard form faces potential liability and loss of future client business 
if the advise turns out to be imprudent or incorrect The ex post 
standard against which the firm’s decisions to depart from the 
standard form is one of what a reasonable attorney in similar 
circumstances might recommend for a client and not necessarily what 
corporate charter term might be most efficient210 Although firms and 
attorneys may have incentives to innovate when it comes to critical 
“bet the company decisions”, such incentives are not as strong with 
respect to decisions that are less immediately critical to the 
 
incorporate the business and three choices are given: Delaware, California, or Other. In 
providing these three choices, the lawyers make it more likely that firms will decide to 
accept either a Delaware or a home state — in this case California — incorporation 
rather than any other states. This is consistent with what Daines observed in his study. 
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corporation, such as decisions where to incorporate and the content of 
the corporate charter.211 
This payoff asymmetry is responsible for an endowment effect with 
respect to the content of form charters.212 Consequently, one can and 
should expect a high degree of status quo bias influencing the content 
of corporate charters and inhibiting efficient innovation. The 
contractarian approach to the content of incorporation decisions is 
thus illusory. Where status quo bias plays a role in deterring 
innovation and efficient contracting in corporate charters, there may 
be a valuable role for policymakers in promoting efficient innovation 
through a legislative approach. 
Default rules and the framing of choices in the context of 
incorporation decisions matter.213 Knowing that default rules can 
become “quasi-immutable” also raises the stakes on regulatory 
decisions by policymakers.214 Policymakers must be aware that few 
incorporators will deviate from the default rules selected by the 
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legislature because incorporators tend to adopt “plain vanilla” charters 
with little tailoring. Consequently, the content of these plain vanilla 
charters will rely almost exclusively on the default terms of corporate 
law as determined by policymakers. 
V. THE ROLE OF AN AMENDMENT IN OVERCOMING BEHAVIORAL 
CHALLENGES 
In this Part, I recommend the adoption of a new section 102(b)(8) 
to the Delaware Corporate Code. Structured as a “menu,” this optional 
provision permits firms to include exclusive forum provisions in their 
corporate charters.215 The proposed amendment is not a complete bar 
against bringing cases in foreign jurisdictions, but it is designed to 
deter wasteful suits while leaving the door open for the adjudication of 
valuable claims. First, the choice of forum provision creates a 
presumption that the state of incorporation is the proper forum for the 
adjudication of intracorporate disputes. Second, the proposed 
provision permits shareholders representing more than ten percent of 
the outstanding shares to waive the provision in favor of pursuing 
litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.216 The structure of this proposed 
amendment is neither a mandatory nor a default provision. Rather, the 
proposed amendment is structured as an opt-in menu, and is thus a 
minimally intrusive option for improving private contracting of 
between shareholders and corporations. By relying on an opt-in menu 
provision, the proposed amendment facilitates the adoption of a new 
standard provision that helps drafters overcome status quo bias while 
still leaving parties with sufficient flexibility to make their own 
determinations about the proper forum for the adjudication of their 
intracorporate disputes. 
A. An Opt-in Menu Is More Appropriate Than a Default Rule in the 
Corporate Setting 
A mandatory rule may prove too much. At the core of modern 
corporate law is the understanding that the relationship between 
shareholders and the firm is inherently contractual.217 This means that, 
to the extent possible, policymakers should refrain from imposing 
mandatory rules for all firms. When policymakers step in, they should 
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do so in a way that is minimally invasive.218 A mandatory rule with 
respect to the forum for adjudication of intracorporate disputes is not 
necessary. Although a market failure is likely responsible for the lack 
of contractual innovation with respect to forum provisions in charters, 
this obstacle is not impassible. There is no reason to believe that 
parties will not be able to overcome these market failures on their own 
once market actors are able to resolve the cognitive biases presently 
hindering innovation. 
Although default rules are not mandatory, if we believe that default 
rules tend to become quasi-immutable, then setting a default rule may 
not be consistent with our core value of permitting members of the 
firm to establish the boundaries of their own relationships.219 When 
default rules become quasi-immutable, the results of contracting are 
far more susceptible to status quo bias and less likely to reflect the true 
preferences of the parties.220 The power of status quo bias in 
contracting is real. By merely changing the default rule, one can affect 
the equilibrium outcomes.221 While parties may agree to particular 
terms — or plain vanilla charters — one cannot with confidence assert 
that these contracting results represent efficient outcomes. Although 
we may take care when establishing default rules to ensure they are 
efficient by effectively depriving shareholders of the ability to contract 
for alternate outcomes, the establishment of a default rule — even one 
that may be socially optimal — contravenes values central to corporate 
law.222 
Opt-in menus may be useful in helping policymakers reach socially 
optimal outcomes while maintaining sufficient flexibility to facilitate 
individual tailoring. Professor Ayres correctly notes that “merely 
tell[ing] private parties that an alternative outcome is acceptable 
[through the use of menus] may have dramatic consequences.”223 
More liberal use of menus in corporate law, may well have the effect of 
improving outcomes from an efficiency point of view. Delaware’s 
corporate code already provides for a number of opt-in menu 
provisions, such as classified boards and limited liability, and the 
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legislature has taken actions to promote the adoption of other value 
increasing innovations through the use of opt-in menus.224 For 
example, in response to increasing desire by shareholders for 
flexibility with respect to shareholder voting provisions, the Delaware 
legislature adopted sections 141(b) and 216 of the Delaware Code.225 
Taken together, these “majority voting provisions” make it possible for 
shareholders to voluntarily adopt value-enhancing voting regimes.226 
The new sections do not require firms to adopt majority voting 
provisions or bylaws and are thus not mandatory. They do, however, 
provide an avenue to facilitate the voluntary adoption of such 
provisions, which a large number of firms did in the wake of the 
passage of the legislation.227 
In the same way that opt-in menus facilitate the adoption of 
majority voting provisions, opt-in provisions can facilitate the 
adoption of forum selection provisions in corporate charters. The opt-
in menu accomplishes this by framing the decisions available to 
incorporators. In the absence of a menu, incorporators must free-draft 
a provision; however, incorporators are influenced by the endowment 
effect.228 A menu that facilitates the adoption of a forum selection 
provision reduces endowment effects with respect to plain vanilla 
charters and encourages tailoring necessary for innovation. 
Increased tailoring through the use of menus furthers two important 
goals: first, reinforcing the core value of private ordering in corporate 
contracting; and second, facilitating increased adoption of such 
provisions through tailoring improves social efficiency. As with 
selecting default rules, reliance on menus to facilitate decision-making 
and encourage innovation is inherently a value-driven exercise.229 
Consequently, when legislatures decide on the content of menu 
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options, they should take a careful approach to deciding the content of 
default rules.230 
B. Risks Associated with the Legislative Option 
There are reasonable objections, as well as potential risks, associated 
with pursuing a legislative option to resolving the out-of-Delaware 
trend. First and foremost is the objection that because the law already 
permits shareholders and firms to contract for an exclusive forum in 
the state of incorporation, adding a menu option to the corporate code 
is unnecessary. There is reason to suspect that status quo bias is 
responsible for the lack of innovation with respect to corporate 
charters and the forum provision. Although it is possible that 
incorporators will adopt the forum provision as a standard term over 
time, it is by no means certain that the market can overcome market 
failures without modest interventions. Even if firms move over the 
long-term to adopt forum provisions, from the point of view of 
Delaware policymakers, the out-of-Delaware trend poses a more 
immediate threat to the state’s dominant position in the corporate law 
arena. Delaware policymakers may not be willing to wait for an 
uncertain outcome if waiting means that Delaware places its dominant 
position with respect to corporate law at risk. 
A second reasonable objection to the legislative option is that public 
discussion about and promotion of the exclusive forum provision by 
influential persons can influence the development of a new standard 
without the reliance on a legislative intervention.231 This objection 
suggests that proponents of exclusive forum provisions can generate 
an information cascade sufficient to overcome status quo bias amongst 
incorporators of firms and thus cause a change in the standard term.232 
An information cascade can occur “when [it becomes] optimal for an 
individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to 
follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his 
own information.”233 Where decision-makers are cognitively 
constrained, information cascades can be important in the adoption of 
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new standards. When faced with a decision, the decision-maker 
observes others who have previously had an opportunity to evaluate 
the same question. The cognitively constrained decision-maker can 
conserve resources by freeriding off the investigations of others. A 
simple example of an information cascade can be found in fashion 
fads.234 A standards entrepreneur plays a central role in creating a 
critical mass of adopters of a fashion.235 Once a critical mass of earlier 
adopters have followed a fashion or fad, late adopters can conserve 
cognitive resources by following early adopters rather than investigate 
the fashion or making an independent determination about the 
underlying quality of the fashion.236 
With respect to the forum provision, there are already standards 
entrepreneurs at work.237 There is a possibility that the work of these 
entrepreneurs advocating on behalf of the adoption of forum 
provisions may be sufficient to generate an information cascade for the 
adoption of forum provisions. To the extent standards entrepreneurs 
focus on promoting the adoption of exclusive forum provisions in 
corporate bylaws, the recent Galaviz decision may cut short those 
efforts.238 Though the court in Galaviz indicated that it would likely 
approve of an exclusive forum provision found in a certificate of 
incorporation, it struck down an exclusive forum provision adopted 
unilaterally by a board in a bylaw.239 The initial response from law 
firms in the wake of the Galaviz decision cautioned a go-slow 
approach with respect to exclusive forum provisions, which is 
consistent with Korobkin’s view that lawyers are vulnerable to loss 
aversion and are not innovators.240 
Another possible objection to the adoption of an optional exclusive 
forum provision is that the ability of shareholders to bring lawsuits in 
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alternate forums is important to constrain overreaching by the 
Delaware judiciary.241 According to this objection, access to alternate 
forums to interpret Delaware law is an effective constraint on judicial 
overreaching by the Delaware courts.242 If all cases must be heard in 
Delaware, the Delaware courts would have little to restrain them from 
overreaching.243 This is a reasonable concern. The real constraint on 
potential over-reaching by the Delaware courts, however, is not state 
competition or the judiciaries of other states.244 Rather, it is the federal 
government and access to the federal courts.245 The tension between 
state-based corporate law regimes and the Federal oversight of 
securities regulation acts as an important balance to one another.246 
The proposed optional forum provision amendment is consistent with 
the language of SLUSA’s Delaware carve-out and does not purport to 
further restrict shareholders’ ability to bring federal claims in federal 
courts. Continued access to the federal courts, therefore, is an 
important constraint on possible overreaching by the Delaware 
judiciary and is not affected by the proposed amendment. 
At the same time, the proposed provision itself is self-limiting such 
that Delaware courts should not have an incentive to overreach. First, 
the provision proposed in this Article provides for the waiver of the 
applicability of the forum provision by either the board or a greater 
than ten percent shareholder.247 Significant shareholders do not have 
an incentive to engage in forum shopping and will likely seek to 
adjudicate intracorporate disputes in locations that are in the best 
interests of large blocks of stockholders as well as the corporation. By 
providing for a waiver by the board or shareholders representing more 
than ten percent of the outstanding shares, the provision creates 
flexibility in the event there is a reasonable expectation by the board 
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or a significant shareholder that the Delaware courts might not be an 
appropriate forum to adjudicate an intracorporate dispute.248 
Second, the exclusive forum provision does not create an absolute 
bar to the adjudication of suits in foreign jurisdictions. Such 
provisions are only presumptively enforceable. The limits of this 
presumption are delineated by Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.249 Upon 
a motion to dismiss, foreign courts will always retain the ability to 
make an independent determination about the reasonableness of the 
forum provision and its conformity with public policy.250 In the event 
that Delaware overreaches, a foreign jurisdiction can respond by not 
enforcing the forum selection provisions. The existence of the 
presumption, however, remains a powerful disincentive for plaintiffs 
to engage in forum shopping. 
A final objection to the adoption of the proposed amendment is the 
possibility of unintended consequences. Other attempts at 
constraining agency costs in shareholder litigation have resulted in 
unintended consequences; there is no reason to suspect that the 
adoption of an opt-in menu provision will be exempt from that 
experience. For example, it is possible that, in response to the 
adoption of exclusive forum provisions by firms, plaintiffs might 
pursue different litigation strategies. Presently, plaintiffs bringing 
claims in foreign jurisdictions typically ask the court of the foreign 
jurisdiction to apply Delaware law to the adjudication of their claim. 
Rather than litigate Delaware claims in foreign jurisdictions, in 
response to the presence of an exclusive forum provision, litigants 
might take up “real seat doctrine” arguments.251 By engaging in more 
direct challenges to the internal affairs doctrine as a way of defeating 
the exclusive forum clause, plaintiffs might be able to keep cases alive 
long enough to generate uncertainty and settlement value. 
To the extent plaintiffs are successful in challenging the applicability 
of the internal affairs doctrine as a choice of law principle, litigation 
success could be destabilizing to Delaware’s dominant position in the 
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corporate arena.252 Thus, the proposed amendment brings with it the 
risk of an unintended consequence that could potentially threaten 
Delaware’s dominant position in the corporate law arena. Of course, 
the consequence of not taking action in response to the out-of-
Delaware trend is the long-term erosion of Delaware’s ability to 
maintain its own corporate law. On the other hand, the risks 
associated with pursuing a modest legislative intervention are 
uncertain. 
CONCLUSION 
A legislative approach to addressing the out-of-Delaware trend 
represents a possible answer to the issue of forum shopping in 
shareholder litigation. From the point of view of shareholders and 
society as a whole, finding a balance that both permits shareholders to 
pursue claims in an orderly manner and reduces incentives for 
litigants to pursue litigation only for its settlement value is a valuable 
goal. Reducing incentives for plaintiffs to bring litigation outside the 
state of incorporation, and thus effectively limiting intracorporate 
litigation to a single forum, will improve efficiency in the adjudication 
of disputes while ensuring that shareholders maintain access to a 
convenient forum. Additionally, from the perspective of Delaware 
policymakers, limiting incentives for plaintiffs to pursue out-of-
Delaware shareholder litigation is valuable in order to preserve its 
ability to update and maintain its corporate law. On the other hand, 
reliance on forum selection provisions in corporate charters may pose 
some risks of unintended consequences for Delaware policymakers if 
widespread adoption of such provisions generates a backlash against 
Delaware for overreaching. Consequently, if policymakers and firms 
pursue adoption of a legislative approach to resolving this question, 
they must do so with care. 
Part of a careful approach includes additional empirical research 
into the value of forum selection provisions. While such provisions 
appear on their face to be value enhancing, the answer to the question 
of their real value to firms is an empirical one. Presently, the sample 
size of firms with such provisions in place at IPO is small in both 
relative and absolute terms. As firms continue to adopt the provision, 
it will soon become possible to undertake an investigation of the value 
of such provisions at the IPO stage. If, as one can hypothesize, forum 
selection provisions are valuable, then this information can help 
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inform policymakers as they decide whether to pursue a legislative 
option to address the out-of-Delaware trend. 
Should the data warrant a legislative option, the careful approach 
suggests avoiding a default rule limiting the adjudication of 
intracorporate disputes to a forum within the state of incorporation. 
Though parties can contract around default rules, the work of 
behavioral economists explains that once in place, default rules 
become quasi-immutable, thus making possible deviations difficult to 
accomplish. Similarly, waiting for incorporators to adopt such 
provisions in the absence of a default rule is equally unlikely to result 
in an optimal outcome. Rather, the stickiness of default rules and 
inertia in the contracting process suggests that an alternative, more 
flexible, approach to corporate contracting is required.253 Opt-in 
menus are, therefore, a valuable mechanism for overcoming 
contractual inertia and assisting contracting parties reach more 
optimal results. A menu, rather than a default rule can facilitate 
innovation and encourage flexibility in corporate contracting in ways 
that default rules cannot. 
Menus can play an important role in improving Delaware’s 
corporate law. Increased reliance on menus over default rules 
improves flexibility in corporate contracting as incorporators are able 
to reduce the cognitive barriers to adopting innovative terms.254 If the 
adoption of an opt-in menu results in relatively widespread use of the 
exclusive forum provision, that experience can inform the adoption of 
other opt-in menus in other contexts of corporate law. Ultimately, a 
flexible corporate law that promotes drafting of corporate charters that 
more closely reflects the optimal preferences of both shareholders and 
the firm will be more efficient and more durable over time. 
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR PROPOSED §102(B)(8) OF THE 
DELAWARE CODE 
§ 102. Contents of certificate of incorporation. 
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the 
certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the 
certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the following 
matters: . . . 
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(8) a provision providing that the Court of Chancery of the State of 
Delaware shall be the sole and exclusive forum for: (i) any derivative 
action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation; (ii) any 
action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any 
director, officer or other employee of the Corporation to the 
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders; (iii) any action 
asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL; or 
(iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs 
doctrine. The Board of Directors or stockholders entitled to cast at 
least ten percent of the votes, which all stockholders are entitled to 
cast at an annual meeting, may in their discretion waive applicability 
of this provision. 
APPENDIX B: FIRMS WITH EXCLUSIVE FORUM PROVISIONS 
As of December 2010 
 
Firm Name Date of Offering
Netsuite Inc. 11/29/2007 
Financial Engines, Inc. 12/09/2009 
Meru Networks Inc. 03/12/2010 
Primerica, Inc. 03/29/2010 
Inphi Corp. 06/16/2010 
LPL Investment Holdings Inc. 06/18/2010 
Gordmans Stores, Inc. 08/03/2010 
Charter Communications, Inc. 08/20/2010 
TMS International Corp. 08/25/2010 
US Concrete Inc. 08/31/2010 
Chemtura Corp. 09/03/2010 
FXCM Inc. 09/03/2010 
Liberty Mutual Agency Corp. 09/13/2010 
Life Technologies Corp. 10/18/2010 
Aurora Diagnostics 10/25/2010 
Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corp. 11/04/2010 
General Growth Properties 
Howard Hughes Corp. 
11/12/2010 
Spirit Airlines, Inc. 11/19/2010 
Neophotonics, Inc. 11/22/2010 
Harrahs Entertainment 
(S-1 withdrawn) 
11/22/2010 
Fluidigm Corp. 12/03/10 
Motricity, Inc. 12/23/2010 
 
